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Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity:
The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the
Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgmentst
Amy B. COHEN*
INTRODUCTION
On July 12, 1989, the House of Representatives voted to cut the amount
it had appropriated for 1990 for the National Endowment for the Arts
("NEA").' The reduction was made in order to express, congressional dis-
approval of two projects which the NEA had previously funded: the pho-
tography of Robert Mapplethorpe, whose work was criticized for its
homoerotic and sexual content, and of Andres Serrano, whose photograph
of a crucifix submerged in urine was assailed. 2 On July 26, 1989, Senator
Jesse Helms of North Carolina proposed an amendment to the same appro-
priations bill, which provided in part that none of the appropriated funds
could be used to support "obscene or indecent materials." 3 This amendment
t @ Copyright 1990 by Amy B. Cohen.
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; J.D., 1978,
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appreciation to her colleagues, Anne Goldstein, Cathy Jones, Don Korobkm and Russell
VerSteeg, for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and to Howard I. Kalodner,
Dean of Western New England College School of Law, both for supporting this project with
a summer research grant and for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this Article.
The author also would like to thank Dennis Patterson for his suggestions and ideas, Douglas
Wayne, Western New England College School of Law, Class of 1989, for his research assistance,
and Nancy Hachigian, for her technical and secretarial assistance. Finally, the author would
like to thank her family, and especially her husband, Harvey Shrage, for their willingness to
discuss this matter ad nauseam and for their loving support always.
I. 13 CoNo. REc. H3635-55 (daily ed. July 12, 1989).
2. Representative Rohrabacher had proposed a cut of all NEA funding based m part on
his reactions to the Serrano and Mapplethorpe works.. Id. at H3637-38. His amendment was
supported by Representative Dannemeyer of California who also cited the Serrano and Map-
plethorpe works as justifications. Id. at H3640-41. Representative Williams of Montana opposed
the amendment, citing many examples of works of art originally scorned but later appreciated.
Id. at H3641. Although the Rohrabacher amendment to cut all funding was ultimately rejected,
the House did eventually agree to an amendment which cut NEA funding by $45,000, the
combined amount of the grants which had supported the Mapplethorpe and Serrano projects.
Id. at H3653-55.
3. 135 CoNG. REc. S8806 (daily ed. July 26, 1989). The full text of the Helms amendment
provided:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this Act may be
used to promote, disseminate, or produce-
(1) obscene or indecent materials, including but not limited to depictions
of sadomasochism, homo-eroticism, the exploitation of children, or indi-
viduals engaged in sex acts; or
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was also a reaction to the Mapplethorpe and Serrano projects, which Senator
Helms described as "homoerotic pornography" and "blasphemy," respec-
tively 4 Although Senator Metzenbaum of Ohio expressed concern about
congressional involvement in defining art,5 the Senate agreed to the amend-
ment.6 The bill was reported to the committee and, after much debate in
both the House and the Senate, was eventually adopted with more limited
language.7
The Helms amendment controversy and the photographs of Robert Map-
plethorpe and Andres Serrano focused attention on two questions: what is
art, and should the government be involved in that determination? Many
who opposed the Helms amendment expressed concern about any govern-
mental role determining what is "art. ' 8
(2) material which denigrates the objects or beliefs of the adherents of a
particular religion or non-religion; or
(3) material which denigrates, debases, or reviles a person, group, or
class of citizens on the basis of race, creed, sex, handicap, age, or national
origin.
Id.
4. Id. at S8807 (remarks of Sen. Helms).
5. Id. at S8808 (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
6. Id. at S8809.
7. As adopted, the law provides in part:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Endowment
for the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be used to
promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of the National
Endowment for the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be
considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism,
homo-eroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex
acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304, 1989- U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMON. NEws
(103 Stat.) 741 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954).
8. In Congress, for example, Senator Danforth opposed the amendment, questioning,
"[h]ow good are we at defining whether something is suitable art or not suitable art and how
do we draw those definitions?" 135 CONG. REc. S12116 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989). Senator
Jeffords argued, in opposition to the Helms amendment: "We will be restricting the atmosphere
in which the creative process occurs. We will be injecting an element of fear into the creative
process, and adding an unprecedented and I believe an unconstitutional layer of censorship.
We will be discouraging, not encouraging, the promotion and creation of art." Id. at S12131.
Senators Cranston and Kerry were also vehement in their opposition to the Helms amendment.
Senator Cranston womed that the amendment would "serve to move our country toward the
kind of system of state censorship and control of thought and expression that we have fought
wars against at great cost in blood and treasure." Id. at S12132. Senator Kerry observed that
the amendment "will have a chilling effect within the art world and raise serious questions
about standards which Congress should not be defining and, in fact, is ill equipped to define."
Id.
In addition to these congressional comments, many others expressed similar concerns. E.g.,
Danto, Art and Taxpayers, NATION, Aug. 21/28, 1989, at 192, 193 ("[Il]ndividual members of
Congress have revealed themselves as enermes of freedom by letting their aesthetic attitudes
corrupt their political integrity as custodians of the deepest values of a democratic society.");
Healy, Government-A Good Patron but Bad Censor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1989, at A31,
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The concern about the propriety of a governmental role in the definition
of art, which has been played out so vividly in the NEA funding controversy,
has also been an important factor in shaping the structure of American
copyright law. While members of Congress have recently urged the NEA to
take an active role in defining art and making the value judgments inherent
in that definition, Congress and the courts have historically attempted to
structure American copyright law to avoid these very value judgments. 9
In 1903, Justice Holmes cautioned against courts making judgments about
the merits of a given work in determining whether or not that work should
be given copyright protection.' 0 Justice Holmes observed that "[i]t would be
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits."" These words and the view they express,
so often relied upon and quoted by courts 12 and commentators, 3 have
substantially influenced the development of American copyright law in the
twentieth century. Consistent with this opinion, both the courts and Congress
have attempted to shape copyright doctrine so that decisions about the
copyright protection provided to given works and decisions about the in-
fringement of the copyright in such works can be made without regard to
anyone's assessment of the artistic value of the work.' 4
col. 2 ("Government auns in its subsidy of the arts to enhance the quality of life of the
people Government cannot at one and the same time seek that good and then put it at
risk by however righteously conceived a censorship."); Hackney, The Helms Amendment Imperils
the Basis of Intellectual Freedom, Chron. Higher Educ., Sept. 6, 1989, at A48, col. I (criticizes
the Helms amendment as "government discrimination against certain ideas"); McGinms, Banning
U.S. Aid for "Obscene" Art Is Sure to Stifle Freedom of Expression, Chron. Higher Educ.,
Aug. 9, 1989, at A36, col. I ("[T]he government should not directly or indirectly keep any
work from being produced or shown that doesn't physically harm or lead to the physical harm
of the public."); Farrel & Benavidez, Let the Arts Be Unfettered by Politics of the Moment,
L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1989, § 2 (Metro), at 5, col. 1 (Helms amendment considered "the most
serious and radical assault on freedom of expression to occur in this country since the days of
Joe McCarthy and 'blacklists."').
9. See infra notes 17-54 and accompanying text.
10. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (advertising posters held
eligible for copyright protection).
11. Id. at 251.
12. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 439 (4th Cir. 1986); Carol
Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1985); Esquire, Inc. v.
Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Tennessee
Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928
(1970); Trifan, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F Supp. 551, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
13. See, e.g., Demcola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 Mwm. L. Ray. 707, 708 n.10, 712-14 (1983); Jones, Factual
Compilations and the Second Circuit, 52 BRooKLYN L. REy 679, 695 (1986); Note, Works of
Applied Art: An Expansion of Copyright Protection, 56 S. CAL. L. REv 241, 252 (1982)
[hereinafter "Note, Works"]; Note, Problems in Giving Obscenity Copyright Protection: Did
Jartech and Mitchell Brothers Go Too Far?, 36 VAND. L. REv. 403, 418 (1983) [hereinafter
"Note, Problems"].
14. See infra notes 17-90 and accompanying text. As used in this Article, the term "artistic
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Determinations of eligibility for copyright protection are generally made
without regard for the artistic value of the work.15 Judges have often relied
on their assessment of the artistic value of the works at issue, however, in
reaching decisions in cases of copyright infringement. When a court needs
to determine whether a second work infringes the copyright in the first work,
the court must compare the works in order to deterinne the scope of
copyright protection to be afforded the first work. The way judges evaluate
art inevitably affects this determination; their views as to the artistic value
of the works before them has an effect on how far they will be willing to
go to protect the first work by suppressing the second work. 16
This Article focuses on the problem of how artistic values affect deter-
minations of copyright infringement. First, Part I shows that the copyright
statutes embody a congressional desire to have determinations of eligibility
for copyright made without regard for the artistic value of the work at issue.
Part II explores the dangers that Justice Holmes and those who have followed
his lead saw in using assessments of artistic value to make copyright decisions.
Part III discusses how assessments of artistic value influence copyright
infringement determinations, specifically through the application of the idea-
expression dichotomy, a principle used to determine whether the copyright
in a copyrighted work has been infringed. Finally, the Conclusion addresses
the dilemma posed by the discussion in the preceding parts: if copyright
infringement decisions necessarily rely on a judgment as to the artistic value
of the works at issue, how do we address the dangers that worried Justice
Holmes?
I. THE COPYRIGHT STATUTES AND CONGRESS' ATTEMPTS
TO Avom RELIANCE ON ARTISTIC VALUES
As proclaimed in the Constitution, the purpose of copyright law is to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors the exclusive Right to their . Writings . ,17
The ultimate objective of such protection is to ensure the dissemination of
knowledge to the public; by providing authors with protection against copying
value" refers to the evaluation of a work of art on the basis of whatever factors are considered
relevant to the particular judge or decision maker in assessing the value of a work of art, for
example, the work's ability to produce a pleasurable aesthetic reaction, the creativity and skill
that the judge perceives as necessary to create that work, the work's popular appeal and/or its
reception in the fine arts or literary worlds and any other factors that are significant to that
judge. Thus, when it is argued that a judge's view of the artistic value of a given work of art
affects that judge's determination of the scope of copyright protection to be granted to that
work, it is this definition of "artistic value" that is intended.
15. See infra notes 17-54 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 91-228 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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for a period of time, Congress intended to provide authors with the incentive
to create works. After that limited period of protection, the public is ensured
free access to those works. 8
Since 1790, Congress has enacted statutes designed to accomplish this
objective.' 9 In the twentieth century those statutes have revealed a congres-
sional desire to provide copyright without regard for the artistic value of
the work for which protection is sought. This desire is reflected in at least
three aspects of the two principal copyright statutes of the twentieth century,
the 1909 Copyright Act (the "1909 Act")20 and the Copyright Revision Act
of 1976 (the "1976 Act"): 2' the liberal definition of works eligible for
protection, the lack of any substantive evaluation of the merits of the
particular work seeking protection and the provision for statutory damages.
A. The Liberal Definition of Works Eligible
for Copyright Protection
Congress' desire to grant copyright protection regardless of the artistic
value of a particular work is reflected in the very loose terms used m both
the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act to define the type of works eligible for
copyright protection. In the 1909 Act, Congress provided that "all the
writings of an author" were eligible for copyright, 22 a phrase lifted directly
from the constitutional clause empowering Congress to provide copyright
protection.Y No specific definition of "writing" or "author" was provided
in the Act, and although in section five of the 1909 Act Congress listed
several specific categories of copyrightable works, it explicitly indicated that
these categories were not exclusive: "[t]he above specifications shall not be
held to limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in section 4 of this
title, '"2 that is, as "all the writings of an author."' ' By comparing this to
18. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of'Am. v. Urnversal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(Copyright "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors by the-provision of a
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired."); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975) ("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the
other arts. [Tihe ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good."); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.)
("The copyright provides a financial incentive to those who would add to the corpus of existing
knowledge by creating original works."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). See generally 1 M.
NIMIMR & D. NiMi, i, NiMErt ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03, at 1-31 to 1-32 (1989).
19. See infra notes 35, 53, 110.
20. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978) (formerly codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976)).
21. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988)).
22. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978).
23. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978).
25. Id. at § 4.
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the definition of patentability in the patent statute which requires a showing
of novelty, utility and non-obviousness,2 or the specific requirements for
trademark registration provided in the Lanham Act, which denies eligibility
to marks in part based on content, 27 Congress' desire in 1909 not to impose
substantive limitations on the works eligible for copyright is evident?5
This desire not to impose substantive limitations on copyright eligibility is
also revealed in the 1976 Act, where again Congress identified categories of
works which were eligible for copyright, but provided that this list was not
exclusive.29 Although Congress changed the definition of copyrightable works
from "all the writings of an author" to "original works of authorship,"
the legislative history clearly indicates that the requirement that the work be
"onginal" is only a minimal requirement that the work submitted be the
work of the person claiming authorship and not copied from another work.30
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (patent available to anyone who "invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof "); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (patent denied if "the invention was
known or used by others in this country before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent "); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) (patent demed if "subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art ").
27. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1988) (Trademark registration denied if mark "[c]onsists of
or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or
falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute.").
28. Earlier copyright statutes had been more restrictive, limiting copyright protection to
specific categories of works. E.g., Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed
1831) ("map, chart, book"); Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, §§ 1, 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed
1831) ("maps, charts, book or books any historical or other pnnt or pnnts"); Act of Feb.
3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1870) ("books, map, chart, musical composition,
print, cut, or engraving"); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909)
("book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or
negative thereof, or painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and models or designs
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts ").
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added) ("Works of authorship include the following cate-
gories "). The legislative history of this provision makes it clear that congressional intention
here was to maintain an open definition of "works of authorship." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976) ("IT]he list sets out the general area of copyrightable subject matter,
but with sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of the scope
of particular categories."); see also id. at 51 ("Authors are continually finding new ways of
expressing themselves, but it is impossible to forsee the forms that these new expressive methods
will take.").
30. H.R. REP No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51. This concern with keeping aesthetic
values out of copyright decisions is also indicated by the reaction many witnesses had to a
proposed revision to the copyright law that would have modified the standards of copyrighta-
bility. In a report filed by the Register of Copyright in May, 1961, the Register recommended
that a revised standard "should mention that any work, in order to be copyrightable, must
be ixed in some tangible form and must represent the product of original creative authorship."
Housa Comm. ON THE JuDIcIARY, 87TH CONG., IsT SEss., REPORT OF THE REGIsTER OF
COPYiirHTs ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, pt. 1, ,at 10 (Comm.
Print July, 1961) (emphasis added). The use of the word "creative" in this proposal resulted
in quite a stir; those who commented on this recommendation were overwhelmingly opposed
[Vol. 66:175
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Congress explicitly stated that "[t]his standard does not include requirements
of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit,"'" and was not intended to alter the
standard of originality established by the courts under the 1909 Act.32
Congress also stated that "[tihe term 'literary works' does not connotate
any criterion of literary merit or qualitative value' 33 and that "the definition
of 'pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' carries with it no implied
criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic quality." 34 Thus, in the
1976 Act, Congress shaped the definition of copyright eligibility so as wholly
to exclude questions of artistic value.
B. The Lack of Substantive Evaluation as a Prerequisite
to Copyright Protection
The 1909 Act provided copyright protection to all works without requiring
a prelimnary examination of the artistic value of the work or of the degree
of skill or creativity involved in creating that work.3 The 1909 Act provided
to the insertion of the term "creative" due to fears that it would require a subjective evaluation
of the merits of a work as a condition to copyright protection. See HousE Comm. ON THE
JuDIcLARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SEss., DiscussIoN AND CoMMENrs ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRoIGTS ON THE GENERAL REvmsION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, pt. 2, at 247 (Comm.
Print Feb., 1963). M. Arthur Auslander commented, "The Register of Copyrights should not
have the right to deny registration or reject copyrights on 'works of art' based upon a subjective
evaluation as to what is a work of art or the scope of creativity involved in a 'work of art'
without a search or citation. Searching, further, does not seem appropriate for our copyright
proceeding." Id. Similarly, the Authors League of America-noted, "The qualification of
'creativity' should not-be added to the Copyright Act." Id. at 260. "If courts were reqtured to
provide a definition for [creativity], a wide range of criteria could develop depending upon
personal tastes of particular judges " Id. at 313 (remarks of Irwin Karp). "The word
'creative' is subject to too many interpretations." Id. at 411 (remarks of Writers Guild of
America); see also HousE Comm. ON THE JUDiciARY, 89TH CONG., lsT Sass., SuPPLEMENTARY
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYIGHTS ON THE GEINuRAL REvIsION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW: 1965 REvisION BILL, pt. 6, at 3 (Comm. Print May, 1965) (concern about "dangers of
using a word like 'creative' led to its elimination). In the end, the word "creative" was
dropped, and when the first bills to revise the copyright laws were introduced to Congress in
1964, neither the House bill, H.R. 11,947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 16,256 (1964),
nor the Senate bill, S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 16,260 (1964), used that
standard. Instead, the language that was eventually adopted in 17 U.S.C. § 102 was used, that
is, "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."
31. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 54 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
34. Id.
35. Congress has never required a preliminary examination of works seeking copyright
protection to deterine eligibility. The earliest statutes did, however, make registration and
deposit formal prerequisites to copyright. E.g., Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124,
124 (copyright begins "from the recording of title thereof in the clerk's office "); id. at
§ 3 ("[N]o person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act unless he shall first deposit
a printed copy in the clerk's office "). There is also some indication that prior
to the twentieth century, some courts did allow judgments as to the artistic merits of a work
to affect copyright eligibility. See Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. R-v.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
that copyright could be obtained merely by publishing a work with notice
of copyright; there was no requirement that the person seeking copyright
file an application or submit the work for examnation.3 6 Congress provided
for registration and deposit of the copyrighted work37 and made registration
a prerequisite to the right to sue for infringement,3 but Congress did not
require either registration or deposit as prerequisites to copyright itself, nor
did it require any substantive evaluation of the work being submitted. 39
The 1976 Act takes this informality one step further. Under the 1976 Act,
federal copyright in "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression" 4 commences at the time of the work's creation and
fixation.4' The person claiming copyright need not even attach a notice or
publish the work in order to obtain federal copyright for the work; copyright
exists once the work is fixed.42 Registration and deposit do have some impact
on the rights provided to the owner of the copyright, 43 but under the 1976
Act, as with the 1909 Act, these formalities are not prerequisites to protection
and do not involve any substantive evaluation of the subject works."
932, 933 (1939) (the author states that early copynght law tended to "restrict copyright to
works of true intellectual or artistic importance," a reflection of the classicism of the times
and its emphasis on scholarship); Note, Problems, supra note 13, at 405 n.10 (citing several
early cases in which a copyright had been denied to a work based upon its immoral or obscene
content).
36. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 10, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978) ("[Alny person entitled
thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice
of copyright required by this title."). The 1909 Act did provide, however, that copyright in
some unpublished works could be obtained by registration. Id. at § 12.
37. Id. at § 11.
38. Id. at § 13.
39. See Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 37 (1939) (depositing work
not necessary to secure copyright under the 1909 Act; publication with notice will do so); Epoch
Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 740-41 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Registration
of the copyright in a published work is thus not necessary to acquire the copyright, but is
simply a recordation of it."), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); Krafft v. Cohen, 117 F.2d
579, 580 (3d Cir. 1941) ("One secures a copyright on published material by accompanying its
publication with a copyright notice at the place and in the form required by the statute.
Subsequent registration under the provisions of the statute does not create the copyright, but
only records it."); 2 M. NROOR & D. NrnsamR, supra note 18, § 7.16[A], at 7-148.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
41. Id. at § 302(a).
42. See id. at §§ 302, 405.
43. For example, the owner cannot sue for infringement unless the work has been registered.
Id. at § 411. Also, statutory damages and attorney's fees may not be available for infringing
acts which occurred before registration. Id. at § 412.
44. Id. at §§ 401-412. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101), even further reduced the significance of
these formalities by eliminating any requirement of notice as a condition to copyright protection,
even for works that are published. Notice is now completely optional, although Congress gave
the owner incentives to attach notice by providing that no weight would be given to the defense
of innocent infringement to mitigate damages in cases involving works which had included a
copyright notice. Id. at 2857; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-402.
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The ease with which a party can obtain a copyright stands in stark contrast
to the procedural obstacles which the applicant must overcome in order to
obtain either a patent or a federal trademark. Federal patent law provides
for an elaborate and detailed examination of an applicant's claim for a
patent. 4- That examination involves a substantive evaluation of the applicant's
claims and can take a relatively long period of time. 46 This examination
attempts to determine whether the alleged invention, for which a patent is
sought, is sufficiently novel, useful and non-obvious to merit federal patent
protection.4 7 Obtaimng a federal trademark is also more difficult than
obtaining a copyright. The party seeking federal trademark protection must
endure a lengthy application process during which the mark sought to be
registered is examined in order to determine its eligibility for federal trade-
mark registration. 48 The distinctiveness of the mark, its potential conflict
with preexisting marks and other factors are considered before registration
is granted.49
Thus, where Congress desires a mechanism for preliminary evaluation of
an applicant's eligibility for other forms of federal intellectual property
protection, it knows how to create one. Its decision not to impose such a
mechanism as part of copyright law reflects its desire to keep artistic values
out of determinations of copyright eligibility S0
C. The Provision for Statutory Damages
Congress' desire to exclude artistic values from the determination of
copyright protection is also reflected in both the 1909 Act5' and the 1976
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988) (application requirements); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (specifi-
cation of claims); 35 U.S.C. § 113 (1988) (drawings); 35 U.S.C. § 114 (1988) (models and
specimens); 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1988) (oath); 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-133 (1988) (examination process);
35 U.S.C. § 134 (1988) (appeal to Board of Appeals); 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1988) (interference
proceedings).
46. In its annual report for fiscal year 1982, for example, the Comnussioner of Patents and
Trademarks reported that the average time to process a patent application from filing to issue
was 24.2 months for utility, plant and reissue patents. 1982 COMM'R oF PATENTS AND TRADE-
MARKS, ANN. REP. 18.
47. See supra note 26 (discussing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988) .(application); 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1988) (examnation); 15
U.S.C. § 1063 (1988) (opposition proceedings); 15 U.S.C. § 1066 (1988) (interference); 15 U.S.C.§§ 1067-1070 (1988) (appeals to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board); 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988)
(appeals to courts).
49. Id., see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988) (standards for registrability of trademarks).
50. The legislative histories of the 1909 Act and 1976 Act do not explicitly discuss the
decision not to require prelimnary examination of the merits of the work seeking copyright,
perhaps because this aspect of copyright procedure dates back to the Statute of Anne, 1709, 8
Anne, ch. 19, under which protection was granted to pnnted works without any preliminary
evaluation of those works. See L. PATTERSON, CoPYRiGor iN His rolcAL PERSPECTiVE 143-46
(1968). Thus, Congress may have assumed, without discussion, that a preliminary examnation
of the merits of a work as a prereqisite to copyright would be inappropriate.
51. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 101(b), 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978).
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Act, 52 by the provision for statutory ("in lieu") damages. Even if a plaintiff
cannot prove financial injury resulting from infringement, he or she can be
awarded monetary relief, in the discretion of the judge.53 Such provision for
monetary relief where the plaintiff cannot prove any significant financial
harm reflects Congress' belief that every work, even one without proven
economic value, should be protected because the protection offered the
author should not depend on market value.5 4 Here, again, Congress recog-
nized that the artistic value of a work should not be the basis for deterimning
the scope or existence of copyright in that work.
Thus, the core structure of the copyright statutes was designed to nimize,
if not wholly to exclude, the role of artistic evaluation in the awarding of
copyright protection. By providing copyrights to a liberally-defined set of
works without a substantive examination of the merits of those works, and
by allowing recovery of monetary awards in cases where there has not been
any proven economic injury, Congress intended that copyright protection
should not be dependent upon an assessment of the artistic value of the
work.
II. THE "DANGEROUS UNDERTAKING" FEARED BY JUSTICE HOLMES
Why has copyright law been shaped by the desire to have copyright
granted without regard for the artistic value of a work? What is so dangerous
about judges "trained only to the law" making decisions about the eligibility
of a given work for copyright based upon its artistic value? If there were
an objective standard for deterrming how to evaluate art, then presumably
judges could apply that standard, just as they apply other standards in
resolving other issues.
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many people did
believe that there were objective criteria for determning what is good art or
good literature. This view had its roots in the idea that art was mimesis or
52. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
53. The first Amencan copyright statute, Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124,
124-25, similarly provided a fixed minmum penalty, payable by an infringer, a part of which
went to the copyright owner suing for infringement, establishing an early form of the statutory
damages remedy available today under § 504(c) of the 1976 Act.
54. See HOUSE COMM'N ON THE JUDiCIARY, 87TH CONG., lST SESS., REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPUIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF Tr U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, pt. 1, at 102 (Comm'n
Print July, 1961). The report stated:
Statutory damages have been a feature of the U.S. copyright statutes since
1790. The need for this special remedy arises from the acknowledged inadequacy
of actual damages and profits in many cases: The value of a copyright is, by its
nature, difficult to establish, and the loss caused by an infringement is equally
hard to determine.
Id., see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976) ("mhe plaintiff in an
infringement suit is not obliged to submit proof of damages and profits ").
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imitation of nature and that, "good art" was defined on the
basis of the accuracy of the mitation and the ability of the artist to
extract umversal truths from that observation and imitation of nature.5
During the Enlightenment period, Samuel Johnson,5 6 Sir Joshua
55. Plato viewed painting and poetry as imitative and infenor to the truth, which existed
at a level twice removed from the painting or poem, see PLATO, Tim REPUBLIC 277-91 (A.
Bloom trans. 1968), but also believed that true beauty could be found by studying physical
beauty first in particular instances and then on a more universal level, then studying moral
beauty and the beauty of wisdom, and ultimately arriving at a sense of absolute beauty. See
PLATO, TaE SYmposiuM 92-95 (W Hamilton trans. 1980). For Plato, however, the arts did not
seem to have any significant role in this search for the knowledge of beauty. Although Plato
generally viewed poets skeptically, he did seem to believe that some poetry could reveal aspects
of truth if the poet was instructed in principles of justice, goodness and nobility. See PLATO,
Phaedrus, in TH COLLECTED DiALoGUEs OF PLATO 522-23 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds., R.
Hackforth trans. 1961). In order to determine the success of a particular work, the work would
have to be evaluated by one who had knowledge of the original object being imitated and
knowledge of the accuracy of the copy and of the skill with which that copy had been made.
See PLATO, LAWS 45-50 (A. Taylor trans. 1960).
Aristotle also believed that the arts were imitative of reality, but viewed this process of
imitation more positively than did Plato. Aristotle believed that through imitation, the artist
could reveal certain universal truths. Aristotle thus argued that art should be judged by the
quality of the imitation and the artist's adherence to certain rules and structures that insured
that the work would help to reveal these universal truths. Ths view of the purpose of art
underlies Aristotle's conception of the purpose and structure of tragedy. In writing drama,
Aristotle believed that the poet must create a plot based on actions that will necessarily or
probably occur. In other words, the dramatic plot should imitate the universal pattern of human
action in order to fulfill the purposes of art. See ARISTOTLE, Poetics, in 2 T COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2316-40 (J. Barnes ed. 1984).
See generally M. BEARDSLEY, AESTHEnTICS FROM CLASSICAL GREECE TO Tan PRESENT: A SHORT
HISTORY 24-67 (1966); K.E. GILBERT & H. KUHN, A HISTORY OF EsTncs 19-45, 59-73 (1972);
H. OSBORNE, AESTHETICS AND ART THEORY: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 27-41 (1970); E.
SCHRAPER, PRELUDE TO Aisisa cs 42-118 (1968).
56. In his Preface to Shakespeare published in 1765, Johnson argued that the longevity of
Shakespeare's excellent reputation was based on the fact that Shakespeare was "above all
writers, at least above all modern writers, the poet of nature; the poet that holds up to his
readers a faithful nurrour of manners and of life." S. JoHNsoN, Preface to Shakespeare, in
RASSELAS, POEMS, AND SELECTED PROSE 263 (B. Bronson 3d ed. 1971) (1795). Johnson claimed
that art should mirror life:
Nothing can please many, and please long, but just representations of general
nature. The irregular combinations of fanciful invention may delight a-while,
by that novelty of which the common satiety of life sends us all in quest; but the
pleasures of sudden wonder are soon exhausted, and the mind can only repose
on the stability of truth.
Id. at 263. Imitating nature was not enough, however; Johnson criticized Shakespeare for
seerming "to write without any moral purpose." Id. at 271. "He sacrifices virtue to convenience,
and he is so much more careful to please than to instruct This fault the barbarity of his
age cannot extenuate; for it is always a writer's duty to make the world better, and.justice is
a virtue independant [sic] on time or place." Id., see also S. JOHNSON, The Rambler No. 4,
Saturday, March 31, 1750, in id. at 70 ("It is justly considered as the greatest excellency of
art, to imitate nature; but it is necessary to distinguish those parts of nature, which are.most
proper for imitation "). Johnson stated in S. JOHNSON, The History of Rasselas, in id. at
628-29 (1759):
The business of a poet is to examnne, not the individual, but the species
But the knowledge of nature is only half the task of a poet; he must be acquainted
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Reynolds,7 and others"8 elaborated on this view and argued that through
reason they could deduce specific rules and criteria which poets and painters
should follow in order to achieve the Anstotelian goal of finding the umversal
principles of nature and human nature and thus create "good art."
By the nineteenth century, however, the view that art had to imitate nature
and adhere to formal rules was challenged by the Romantic view that art
likewise with all the modes of life. He must write as the interpreter of nature,
and the legislator of mankind, and consider himself as presiding over the thoughts
and manners of future generations; as a being superiour to time and place.
Id.
57 In his Discourses on Art, Sir Joshua Reynolds attempted to instruct young artists on
the principles and goals of good painting. Reynolds believed that only through the exercise of
reason could one discover the standards of good taste. In December, 1776, he wrote:
[W]e will conclude, that whatever goes under the name of taste, which we can
fairly bring under the dominion of reason, must be considered as equally exempt
from change. If therefore, in the course of this enquiry, we can shew that there
are rules for the conduct of the artist which are fixed and invariable, it follows
of course, that the art of the connoisseur, or, in other words, taste, has likewise
invariable principles.
J. REYNOLDs, DiscourasFs ON ART 98-99 (S. Mitchell ed. 1965) (1776). Reynolds went on to
say:
It is reason and good sense therefore which ranks and estimates every art, and
every part of that art, according to its importance We will not allow a man,
who shall prefer the inferior style, to say it is his taste; taste here has nothing,
or at least ought to have nothing to do with the question. He wants not taste,
but sense, and soundness of judgment.
Id. at 105. He further commented:
mhe real substance of what goes under the name of taste, is fixed and
established in the nature of things; that there are certain and regular causes by
which the imagination and passions of men are affected; and that the knowledge
of these causes is acquired by a laborious and diligent investigation of nature
Id. at 109.
Reynolds, like Johnson, believed that art should imitate nature, and further believed, as with
Johnson's view of literature, that in imitating nature, the painter was to go beyond mere
reproductions and to seek umversal truths: "The wish of the genuine painter must be more
extensive: instead of endeavounng to amuse mankind with the rmnute neatness of his imitations,
he must endeavour to improve them by the grandeur of his ideas " Id. at 27. In order to
do this the artist had to study nature because only by "long laborious comparison" could that
artist acquire "a just idea of beautiful forms " Id. at 29. Ultimately, however, it was
through the exercise of reason combined with this study of nature that the artist would find
truth and thus beauty: "As our art is not a divine gift, so neither is it a mechanical trade. Its
foundations are laid in solid science: and practice, though essential to perfection, can never
attain that to which it aims, unless it works under the direction of principle." Id. at 92
(emphasis in original).
58. E.g., J. DRYDEN, A Defence of an Essay of Dramatic Poesy, in 1 ESsAYs OF JOHN
DRYDEN 110-33 (W Ker ed. 1900) (1668). Dryden wrote:
Poesy must resemble natural truth, but it must be ethical. Indeed, the poet dresses
truth, and adorns nature, but does not alter them Therefore that is not the
best poesy which resembles notions of things that are not, to things that are:
though the fancy may be great and the words flowing, yet the soul is but half
satisfied when there is not truth in the foundation.
Id. at 121 (emphasis in original). See generally M. BEARansLY, supra note 55, at 140-79; E.




should be a form of self-expression reflecting the emotions and personality
of the artist. Wordsworth expressed such a view of poetry in writing:
[P]oetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its
origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity: the emotion is contem-
plated till, by a species of re-action, the tranquillity gradually disappears,
and an emotion, kindred to that which was before the subject of
contemplation, is gradually produced, and does, actually exist in the
mind. In this mood successful composition generally begins 59
This emphasis on the individual artist and the expression of emotion was
difficult to reconcile with any fixed, objective criteria for defining good art.
As Coleridge wrote in 1817:
The ultimate end of criticism is much more to establish the principles of
writing, than to furmsh rules how to pass judgement on what has been
written by others . For, even as truth is its own light and evidence,
discovering at once itself and falsehood, so is it the prerogative of poetic
genius to distinguish by parental instinct its proper offspring from the
changelings Could a rule be given from without, poetry would
cease to be poetry, and sink into a mechanical art.60
59. W WoRDswoRTH, Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads, in Sm cTED PoMS
ND PREFACES 460 (J. Stillinger ed. 1965) (2d ed. 1800); see also J. Mii, Thoughts on Poetry
and Its Varieties, in Tim Six GREAT HurwAisnc ESSAYS OF Jomi STuART MILL 3-24 (1969)
(1833). Mill wrote:
The peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the poet's utter unconsciousness
of a listener. Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself in moments of solitude,
and embodying itself in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of
the feeling in the exact shape in wich it exists in the poet's mind.
Id. at 8. With regard to painting, Mill contended that "[t]he power of painting lies in poetry,
not in narrative " Id. at 12. He further contended that it is in the depiction of
individuals that this poetry is expressed because the figures "express the feelings of one person
as modified by the presence of others." Id. See generally M. ABRAMs, Tim MIRROR AND Tim
LAmp: RomANTnc THEORy AND im CRIuCAL TarADroN 21-26, 48-56 (1953); M. BEARnS LY,
supra note 55, at 244-65; G. PIscH-L, A WORLD HisToRY OF ART 578-97 (1975).
60. S. COLERIDE, Biographta Literara, c. XCIII (1817), in ENcLiSH LrratARy CRmcisM:
RoMANTc AND VICTORAN 87-89 (D. Hoffman and S. Hynes eds. 1963); see also M. BEARDSLEY,
supra note 55, at 247 (The Romantics broadened the scope of "good, or great, art to
include works whose comparative loosening of form is considered to be offset by a more
poignant or more individualized presentation of personal emotions "). Immanuel Kant had
provided some of the groundwork for questioning the notion of an objective definition of good
taste. Kant believed that judgments of taste are not cognitive but subjective reactions where, in
matters of pure taste, our aesthetic reactions to an object are based not on our interest in the
function of the object or our desire for the object, but rather are based on a disinterested
reaction to the aesthetic surface of the object, freed from its particular function. Although this
reaction is described as "subjective," in the sense that it is not based on logic or cognition but
based on producing pleasure in the subject experiencing the object, in Kant's view these
subjective reactions were assumed to be universally shared, that is, that anyone viewing that
object would react in the same way, based on the way that object would promote the harmony
of their imagination and understanding. 1. KANT, Critique of Judgment, in P1LosoPmCiAL
WRrnros 150-200 (J. Meredith trans., E. Behler ed. 1986) (1790). Kant attempted to reconcile
the conflict between the claim to the validity of individual taste and the claim to a "correct"
universal standard of taste by describing judgments of taste as based not on determinate, but
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There was thus a tension emerging between the classical view of the creative
process and criticism of creative works and the Romantic view of these
matters.
Justice Holmes' opinion in Bletstein v Donaldson Lithographing Co.61
and its often-quoted line about the dangers of judges making determinations
of artistic merit62 reflects this tension between the classical view that creative
works should conform to formal, objective criteria and the Romantic view
that the creative process is a more subjective, personal reflection of the
individual artist and thus that creative works are harder to judge on the
basis of objective criteria. In Bleistein, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
had infringed their copyright in certain circus advertising posters. Justice
Holmes concluded that neither the fact that a work was used for commercial
purposes nor the fact that a work was of "little merit or of humble degree" 63
was a basis for denying copyright to such a work. He then explored the
risks created if the courts were to make decisions about the artistic worthiness
of a work.
In part, Justice Holmes' opinion reflected the view that there is no objective
basis for evaluating art. Holmes worried that if judges decided copyright
matters on the basis of artistic merit, "some works of genius would be sure
to miss appreciation'' 64 because the decision makers might not be sopisti-
cated enough to recognize the value of a given work at a given time. This
would be especially true with works considered avant-garde: "Their very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new
language in which their author spoke." ' 65 Justice Holmes cited as one example
the paintings of Manet," which met with public disapproval when first
exhibited in the 1860s, but which, by 1903, were not only accepted but
highly valued by the public as well as the art world. 67 Justice Holmes seemed
concerned that allowing decision makers to rely on their personal artistic
values would lead to a denial of copyright protection for works that later
generations might consider to be works of artistic genius. As a result, creative
indetermnate concepts, and concluding that "[t]o supply a determinate objective principle of
taste in accordance with which its judgements might be denved, tested, and proved, is an
absolute impossibility, for then it would not be a judgement of taste." Id. at 242. Kant believed,
however, that this indeterminate judgment of taste was a judgment which could find some
umversality based on the free play of cognitive faculties which are shared by everyone. Id. at
173-76. See generally M. BEa DnsLEY, supra note 55, at 212-24; D. CRAwsoRD, KAr's AEsThETnc
THnoRY 111-18 (1974); K. GILBERT & H. KuN, supra note 55, at 321-44; I. KANT, supra, at
xii; I. KNox, TnE AsTrmnc THnoams oF KANT, HEGEL AND SCHOPENHAUER 19-44 (1958); H.
OsBoaRN, supra note 55, at 171-91.
61. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
62. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.




67 IM:PREssIONiSM 302-03 (J. Clay ed. 1973).
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expression might stagnate because artists might be induced to follow tradi-
tional, conservative modes of expression, rather than to develop new and
experimental modes of expression. Thus, Holmes recognized that artistic
standards change over time and that there is no unchanging objective basis
for evaluating art on which judges can rely in determining copyright protec-
tion.
Justice Holmes also realized that a second risk would be created if "persons
trained only to the law" decided the worth of a creative work: "[C]opyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than
the judge."' 6 That is, in Justice Holmes' view, although judges might not
be sophisticated enough to appreciate the avant-garde, they could be too
sophisticated to appreciate the tastes of the general public. Since such works
have economic value, in Justice Holmes' view, the creator is entitled to
protection from those who would copy such works and deny the creator the
financial benefits to which he or she is entitled, even though such works
may fail to meet Justice Holmes' personal view of good art. Justice Holmes
did not, however, conceal his own low opinion of such taste, as revealed in
his comment that such taste is "an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever
may be our hopes for a change." 69 However, he conceded that works that
68. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.
69. Id. at 252. Justice Holmes had very definite opinions about what constituted "good
art" and "good literature." Born into an aristocratic and intellectual Boston family in 1841,
he grew up surrounded by some of the "best table conversation" in Boston. TEE MIND AND
FArm OF JuSTIcE HoLusS: His SPEncans, ESSAYS, LETrERS, AND JUDICIAL OPINIONs at xvii (M.
Lemer ed. 1946) [hereinafter M. Lemer]. See generally S. NovicK, HONORABLn JUsTICE: THE
Lnm oF OLVER WnDEL HoLmse 9-28 (1989). His father, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, was a
famous physician and poet, and was active in the Boston literary world. He had very orthodox
standards of good taste grounded in what he considered moral values and tried to instill those
values and standards in his son, with varyihg degrees of success. M. HowE, JUSTICE OLIVER
Wmm. Hoixas: Tan SAPiNo YEARS 1841-1870, at 11-17 (1957); M. Lerner, supra, at xvii-
xxi. Some of this influence was reflected in an essay the younger Holmes wrote while a student
at Harvard College, in wich he wrote that "there is nothing in literature so elevating" as the
classic books of great literature, wich he defined as including Shakespeare, Montaigne, Goethe,
Plato, Confucius, among others, and that "[t]he great secret of all delight m literature is
preserving this fineness of taste " M. HowE, supra, at 45 (quoting Books, 4 HARv MAo.
408 (1858)). Later college essays on Plato and Diirer and book reviews reflected Holmes' belief
that art should seek to capture ideals and universal truths. M. HowE, supra, at 56-59, 60-61.
Holmes apparently, however, was not narrowly selective in Ins choices of reading books; he
was a voracious reader whose tastes ranged from philosophy and the classics to detective stones
and modem novels. J. MONAGAN, Tan GRAND PAN.ANDRuM: MELLow YEARS OF JUSTICE HoLMES
103-08 (1988). Holmes also was very interested in art prints and engravings, which he studied
and collected. Id. at 108. Max Lerner claimed that this personal interest is reflected in Holmes'
ruling m Bleistein that the copyright statute could protect lithographs. M. Lemer, supra, at
208-09.
On the other .hand, Holmes did recognize that there might not be unanimity in matters of
taste. In 1902, he wrote to Lady Pollock about some books that he had been reading. Although
he stated his own opinions on literature quite vehemently ("a picture of a squalid and worthless
life is a kind of art in which I take little pleasure"), he also recognized that others' tastes could
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appeal to the public's taste must be given copyright protection because "the
taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt. ' 70 Thus, Holmes'
opinion reflects the paradox presented by the tension between the classical
and Romantic views of art: there is no objective basis for evaluating art,
but some art is better than other art.
Tins paradox presented by the tension between the classical and Romantic
views of art has been exacerbated during the twentieth century by the
continuing challenge to the view that artistic value can be objectively deter-
mined. George Santayana wrote in 1896 that "beauty is a species of value, ' 7'
and that "[vialues spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of
vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature. ' 72 Santayana
argued that determinations of beauty are not intellectual judgments or
judgments of fact, but judgments of value that are based on whether or not
the given work produces the sensation of aesthetic pleasure. An accurate
imitation is aesthetically valuable not because it is true or realistic, but
because our perception of that truth or realism produces pleasure. 73 Santayana
also recognized that the claim of universality in aesthetic judgment was
inaccurate.
There is notoriously no great agreement upon aesthetic matters; and such
agreement as there is, is based upon similarity of origin, nature, and
differ from his:
Well, to be civilized is to be potentially master of all possible ideas, and that
means that one has got beyond being shocked, although one preserves one's own
moral and aesthetic preferences. I regard the latter, however, as more or less
arbitrary, although none the less dogmatic on that account. We tacitly
postulate that if others were as intelligent and well educated as we they would be
compelled to agree with us-but that is a mere ideal, not an actuality.
Letter from O.W Holmes to Lady Pollock (Sept. 6, 1902), reprinted in 1 HOLmE5-POLLOCK
LErams 105 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
Recognizing these individual differences, however, did not mean for Holmes that there was
no "objective reality in which is to be found the unity of our several compulsions ";
ultimately, he left that as a question to be addressed by philosophers. Similarly, in a letter to
Harold J. Laski in 1926, Holmes responded to Laski's "raptures over Jane Austen," with
which Holmes appeared to disagree as follows: "She shines in the firmament of your world
You are the God of that, but the religion of taste is polytheistic." Letter from O.W Holmes
to H.J. Laski (Aug. 5, 1926), reprinted in HoLuss-LAsri L=arrzs 863 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
Thus, although Holmes held very strong views of what he liked in art and literature, he
recognized that others could hold different views. This is generally consistent with Holmes'
overall view that law is not based on moral absolutes, but developed by human beings to meet
and to reflect the circumstances of the times. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAov. L.
Ra,. 457 (1897). See generally Laski, The Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, 40
HARv L. Rsv 683, 685-89 (1931); McKinnon, The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes, 36 A.B.A.
J. 261 (1950). McKinnon describes the nihilistic aspects of Holmes' philosophy. Id. at 344.
That is, there may be a conflict between the philosophic views Holmes promoted in his writings
and those deeply held values upon which he actually acted in deciding cases.
70. Bletstem, 188 U.S. at 252.
71. G.-SANTAYANA, THE SENSE OF BEAUTy 24 (P Rice ed. 1955).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 25-26.
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circumstance among men, a similarity which, where it exists, tends to
bring about identity in all judgments and feelings. It is unmeaning to
say that what is beautiful to one man ought to be beautiful to another.
If their senses are the same, their associations and dispositions similar,
then the same thing will certainly be beautiful to both.74
Although Santayana thus believed aesthetic values were subjectively deter-
mined and based to some extent on the personal background of the observer,
he also believed that taste was a value that could be developed and that
exposure to beauty led to a finer aesthetic sensibility.75 Thus, like Justice
Holmes, he believed that all taste was relative, but that some people's taste
was better than others.
John Dewey, writing in 1934, criticized the art establishment for removing
the experience of art from the realities of ordinary experience. He objected
to setting art on a pedestal and to "the rise of the compartmental conception
of fine art.''76 Dewey also objected to traditional art criticism which imposed
formal rules and standards on art in order to judge it, and he specifically
rejected the neoclassical approach to judging art. He also, however, rejected
the opposite approach to criticism which denied the existence of any objective
values at all, or what he described as the "impressionistic" approach in
which the critic claims that all that criticism can provide is simply -the
individual reactions of the critic to the particular work of art. Dewey argued
that true criticism should state "what a work of art is as an experience"
because doing so "may render particular experiences of particular works of
art more pertinent to the object experienced, more aware of its own content
and intent. '77 Thus, according to Dewey, critics should know about the
history of art, about the background of the individual artist and about that
artist's other works in order to understand and appreciate the experience of
the artist in creating the work of art. For Dewey, "[tihe function of criticism
is the reeducation of perception of works of art.. . The conception that
its business is to appraise, to judge in the legal and moral sense, arrests the
perception of those who are influenced, by the criticism that assumes this
task."7" Thus, Dewey believed that a work of art should be valued for the
experience that created it and for what the work can tell an audience about
74. Id. at 44 (emphasis in onginal).
75. See id. at 80-82, 114, 127-30.
76. J. DEwEY, ART As ExPERIENCE 8 (1934). He attributed this in part to capitalism and
the development of modem industry and commerce and saw works of art becoming economc
commodities valued as investments and as status symbols, not for their aesthetic qualities. Id.
at 8-9.
77. Id. at 309; see also id. at 298-309.
78. Id. at 324. Other writers who rejected the neoclassical view that art should imitate
nature and conform to certain formal rules and standards include Benedetto Croce, see generally
B. CROCE, Ansrn=c AS SCIENCE OF ExPREssioN AND GENERAL LnsiNusnc 170-210 (D. Ainslie
trans. 1909), and R. Collingwood, see generally R. COLLINGWOOD, EssAYs N no PHosoPHY
OF ART 55-77, 121-28 (A. Donegan ed. 1964).
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that experience, not for its ability to conform to specific objective criteria.
In current discourse, many writers argue that our definitions and modes
of evaluating and criticizing art and literature are culturally determined and
reflect the individual background and identity of the individual viewing the
work. For example, Barbara Herrnstein Smith claims that "[olur interpre-
tation of a work and our experience of its value are mutually dependent,
and each depends upon what might be called the psychological 'set' of our
encounter with it: the nature and potency of our own assumptions,
expectations, capacities, and interests with respect to it ,,79 Smith sug-
gests:
[What we may be doing when we make an explicit value judgment
of a literary work is (a) articulating an estimate of how well that work
will serve certain implicitly defined functions (b) for a specific implicitly
defined audience, (c) who are conceived of as expenencing the work
under certain implicitly defined conditions.'0
In other words, Smith believes that all judgments about a literary work (or
any other work of art, for that matter) are a function of the identity and
background of the observer and the expectations that the observer has with
respect both to the function or classification of the work being experienced
and to the particular audience that will also be experiencing that work."'
Thus, according to Smith, there can only be "umversally shared objective
standards" in a totally homogeneous society that is insulated from external
influences and safe from internal dissension. 2 Smith argues that with the
more typical heterogeneous society, individuals will agree on matters of taste
with respect to works that satisfy the types of needs and interests that are
widely shared by the individuals in that community; conversely, the indivi-
duals in that same community will tend to disagree on matters of taste with
respect to works that satisfy the types of needs and interests which are not
widely shared by the individuals in that community Those in authority in
such communities will thus have an interest in validating the community's
shared taste in order to maintain stability and justify their authority. It is
essentially through this kind of process, according to Smith, that the estab-
lished Western canon of literary and artistic works was established and is
perpetuated. 3
Other writers have made similar claims. Terry Eagleton has argued that
what we mean by literature is a "hughly valued kind of writing," and that since
79. B. SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRTCAL THEORY
10 (1988).
80. Id. at 13.
81. See generally id. at 9-16, 30-35.
82. Id. at 93.
83. Id. at 24-27, 35-53.
84. E.g., T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1983). Eagleton claims that
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value-judgements are notoriously variable. There is no such thing as
a literary work or tradition which is valuable in itself, regardless of what
anyone might have said or come to say about it. 'Value' is a transitive
term: it means whatever is valued by certain people in specific situations,
according to particular criteria and in the light of given purposes.
8
'
Others have argued that all definitions of art are institutionally determined
by the art world and its cultural practices and conventions and that there
are no external, objective determinants of what is art.17 The tendency in
postmodern art and literature to collapse the boundaries between "high
culture" and popular culture and between different genres and art forms
has also been seen as a rejection of the classical definition of art and of the
the rise of English literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was essentially political,
that is, that literature was used by the political and economic elite as propaganda to "com-
muricate to [the working classes] the moral riches of bourgeois civilization and curb
in them any disruptive tendency to collective political action." Id. at 25. After discussing the
various theories and approaches to literary criticism, Eagleton concludes that all literary theory
is also political and ideological and that "[d]epartments of literature in higher education
are part of the ideological apparatus of the modem capitalist state," id. at 200, which perpetuate
the reactionary notion that literature can be defined and criticized in a way that is not based
on political values. See generally id. at 194-205.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id. at 11; see also J. Woiur, AEsrHaCS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF ART (1983). Wolff
claims:
Criticism, and the history of art and literature, then, are ideological, both in the
sense that they originate and are practised in particular social conditions, and bear
the mark of those conditions, and in the sense that they systematically obscure
and deny these very determinants and origins. It is for this reason that aesthetics
can take no reassurance from criticism that 'the great tradition' really is great.
The great tradition is the product of the Istory of art, the history of art
history, and the history of art criticism, each of which, in its turn, is the social
history of groups, power relations, institutions and established practices and
conventions.
Id. at 16; see also N. HADHmicoi..ou, ART HISTORY AND CLAss STRUooLE (L. Asmal trans.
1978). Hadjinicolaou argues that all works of art contain a visual ideology, which he defines
as "the way in which the formal and thematic elements of a picture are combined on each
specific occasion. This combination is a particular form of the overall ideology of a social
class." Id. at 95. In other words, every work of art alludes to a particular social reality that
is a reflection of a particular social class. See id. at 95-183. Hadjimcolaou concludes that
judgments concerning the aesthetic value of a given work of art are a product of the identity
of the particular judge: "[A]esthetic effect is none other than the pleasure felt by the observer
when he recognizes himself in a picture's visual ideology." Id. at 182; see also Bourdieu, THE
ARSOCRACY OF CULTURE, 2 MEDIA, CUrLan AND SOCIETY 225 (1980) (author considers high
culture as a product of the aristocracy that is best appreciated by those living under certain
conditions and that is valued for how it facilitates class distinctions).
In addition, psychological studies have been done to demonstrate that aesthetic reactions
vary, to some extent, based on gender, age and cultural background. R. Piciu'oRD, PSYCHOLOGY
AND VISUAL AESTHEIcs 150-80 (1972) (survey of studies comparing reactions to colors, pictures,
patterns, portraits and other visual works, based on race, gender, age and cultural background).
87. See G. DicKJE, ART AND THE AESTHETIC: AN INSTiTuTioNAL ANALYSIS 27-52, 170-81
(1974); cf. Carroll, Art, Practice, and Narrative, 71 THE MONIST 140-55 (1988).
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notion that artistic value can be objectively determined. 81 Although some
dispute these views and criticize the consequences of relativism and "stan-
dardlessness" that they fear these views may cause, s9 there is no doubt that
the view that there is an objective definition of artistic value is no longer
taken as a given.9°
This growing twentieth-century skepticism regarding the existence of any
objective or neutral definition of artistic value helps to explain why Congress
and the courts are reluctant to allow copyright determinations to be made
on the basis of a judge's view of a work's artistic value. If determinations
of artistic value reflect the background and identity of the individual decision
maker and there is no objective test of artistic merit, then works created by
those and for those whose background and values are different from those
of the decision maker may not be appreciated by that decision maker. The
cultural understanding and values that would be reflected in copyright
decisions could be startlingly narrow if based upon judges' views of artistic
value.
Justice Holmes' warmngs about the "dangerous undertaking" are thus
understandable. If writers such as Smith and Eagleton are right and there is
88. See L. HuTcHE N, A POETICS OF POSTMODERgiSM 3-20, 40-43 (1988). Hutcheon claims:
[Postmodernism] does not so much deny as contest the "truths" of reality and
fiction-the human constructs by which we manage to live in our world. Fiction
does not mirror reality; nor does it reproduce it. It cannot. There is no pretense
of simplistic mimesis in historiographic metafiction. Instead, fiction is offered as
another of the discourses by which we construct our versions of reality
Id. at 40; see also F Jameson, Postmodermsm and Consumer Society, in POST MODERNISM
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 13-29 (E. Kaplan ed. 1988).
89. See, e.g., E. HIRSCH, JR., CutTuRAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO
KNow (1987); A. BLOOM, THE CLOSNG OF THE AMEIucAN MIND (1987). Hirsch disagrees with
those who argue that teaching the traditional literary canon is a means of preserving the status
quo and criticizes those changes in our educational system that have meant that children are
not being exposed to the established elements of our literate culture. E. HIRscH, supra, at 20-
24, 125-26, 144. On the other hand, Hirsch recognizes that the formation of a national culture,
as well as the creation of national languages, is a conscious process done for the purpose of
creating certain shared experiences and values to facilitate communication among members of
that nation. Id. at 70-93. Hirsch thus is not contending that the elements of our literate culture
are objectively better than other works or cultures, but rather that it is essential for members
of our culture to have the background knowledge of those elements in order to function within
this culture. Bloom is less tempered in his condemnation of what he considers "cultural
relativism"- "The unrestrained and thoughtless pursuit of openness, without recognizing the
inherent political, social or cultural problem of openness as the goal of nature, has rendered
openness meaningless. Cultural relativism destroys both one's good and the good." A. BLOOM,
supra, at 38. Bloom criticizes contemporary education for failing to require students to read
what Bloom considers the classics, id. at 62-67, and considers feminism "the latest enemy of
the vitality of classic texts." Id. at 65. Bloom says that "[t]he failure to read good books both
enfeebles the vision and strengthens our most fatal tendency-the belief that the here and now
is all there is." Id. at 64. Bloom calls for a return to a traditional "Great Books" approach
to liberal education, in which students read the "classic" texts. Id. at 336-47
90. This is also evident in the heated debate going on in academic circles over the proper
content of the educational curriculum. See, e.g., Berger, Ibn Batuta and Sitar Challenging
Marco Polo and Violin in Schools, N.Y Times, Apr. 12, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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no objective basis for determining artistic value, then allowing judges to
determine copyright protection on the basis of their view as to a work's
artistic value would result in subjective determinations based upon the judges'
own cultural experiences and values. Given the problems and unfairness that
this would cause, it would be best if copyright infringement decisions could
be made without regard to a judge's view of the artistic value of the work.
Part III will explore how the courts have attempted to accomplish that goal.
III. THE COURTS' ATTEMPTS TO Avoin ARTISTIC VALUES
IN DETERMINING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT:
THE IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY
In Part I, we discussed how Congress designed the basic structure of the
copyright statutes to insure that a given work would be eligible for copyright,
regardless of its perceived artistic value.9 ' As a practical matter, however,
91. Although there have been cases where the lack of merit in a particular work has been
a factor relied upon in denying copyrightability to the overall work, e.g., Toro Co. v. R & R
Prod. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) (numbenng system used in plaintiff's catalogs
for sales of replacement parts for lawn care machines held uncopyrightable because "[t]he
random and arbitrary use of numbers in the public domain does not evince enough originality
to distinguish authorship"); Durham Industries v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir.
1980) (plastic reproductions of cartoon characters lacked sufficient originality to be copyrightable
since there was "nothing recognizably the author's own contribution" to the previously created
characters); L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (plastic replica of an antique
bank not sufficiently skilled or original to be copyrightable), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976),
by and large, the initial question of copyrightability has been answered without regard to the
underlying artistic value of the work as perceived by the judge. One broad exception is the rule
that provides:
[T]he design of a useful article shall be considered a pictorial, graphic or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from,
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Many commentators have argued that the application of this rule in
determining the copyrightability of a useful article violates the Bleistem nondiscrimination
principle because it is easier to identify artistic features that can exist independently of the
useful article if those features are in a traditional, representational style than if they are abstract,
contemporary designs. E.g., Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach
to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv 707 (1983); Reichman, Design Protection in
Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act
of 1976, 1983 Duira L.J. 1143; Note, Works of Applied Art: An Expansion of Copyright
Protection, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 241 (1982); Note, Copyright Law-Copyrght Protection for
Industrial Designs Under the 1976 Copyrights Act, 25 WAYNE L. Rav. 923 (1979). These
commentators all believe in the wisdom of the Bletstem rule and have proposed different ways
of determining the copyrightability of useful articles to avoid the subjectivity that the "sepa-
rability" test seems to produce. For example, Professor Demcola suggests that the focus should
be on the process of creating the work, not on the end product itself; the determination of
copyrightability should be based on the extent to which the process of creating the work
"reflects artistic expression uninhibited by functional considerations." Denicola, supra, at 741.
Professor Reichman, on the other hand, contrasts the American approach to useful articles
with the systems used in other nations, for example, the French failure to distinguish useful
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the real test of copyright is not whether the plaintiff is considered to have
created a work that is generally eligible for copyright protection, but whether
the plaintiff will be able to obtain relief against someone who has allegedly
infringed that copyright. In other words, the real value of the copyright in
a given work is measured by the scope of protection it provides to the
copyright owner who claims that his or her copyright in that work has been
infringed. These decisions determimng the scope of copyright protection in
a work alleged to be infringed have been substantially affected by determi-
nations of that work's artistic value. In order to appreciate how these
determinations of artistic value affect infringement decisions, one must first
understand how courts determine copyright infringement.
A. The Process of Determining Infringement and the Role
of the Idea-Expression Dichotomy
Congress did not provide any clear guidelines for courts to use in deter-
mimng infringement, but left it to the courts to develop their own method-
ology and standards. 92 In essence, courts today engage in a two-step process
in determimng copyright infringement. First, the court must determine if the
alleged infringer had access to the plaintiff's work. Since copyright law only
protects against actual copying of the protected material, not the coincidental
independent creation of a similar work, a party cannot be held liable for
infringement if that party never saw the protected work. Thus, the first step
articles from other works of art for purposes of copyright, and the Italian separate treatment
of useful articles. Reichman, supra, at 1143. Reichman concluded that since the United States
copyright statute contains a "separability" provision, there should be an entirely separate statute
to provide protection to industrial designs. Reichman, supra, at 1260-64. A full discussion of
this particular problem is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is important to recognize how
generally it is accepted that copyright decisions should be made independently of any judgment
as to the aesthetic merits of the work at issue. See also Jones, Factual Compilation and the
Second Circuit, 52 BRooKLYN L. Rav 679, 687 (1986) (author criticizes Second Circuit opinions
which consider factual compilations copyrightable only if the author has exercised selectivity in
choosing data or arranged the data distinctively because author claims that such a test requires
qualitative judgments that conflict with established principles of copyright law); cf. Note,
Problems, supra note 13, at 403 (author argues that copyright protection could be denied to
obscene works without violating the copyright's nondiscrimnation principle because that principle
is based on a decision not to require aesthetic merit as a prerequisite to copyright; author
argues courts are confusing "bad art" with "obscenity" and says that law could deny protection
to obscene works without denying protection to "bad art" because the two determinations are
so different); see also Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663, 749 (author argues
that Bleistem principle was taken too far in using it to justify copyrights on computer programs
in machine-readable form because Bleistem does not stand for copyright protection being
extended to any work, but, rather, that copyrights should be granted to those works that have
some "nonfunctional aesthetic, informational or entertaining qualities which are communicated
to a human audience" without regard for the quality of that work).
92. See Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial
Similarity, 20 U.C. DAvis L. Rav 719, 720-22 (1987).
[Vol. 66:175
ARTISTIC VALUE JUDGMENTS
in analyzing an infringement claim is determining whether the defendant
saw, or had an opportunity to see, the protected work. 93
If access can be established, the court must then determine if the allegedly
infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. The precise
meaning of "substantial similarity" is not at all clear because courts have
used varying standards to determine whether the similarity is substantial.9
One indispensable corollary of that rule is that the substantial similarity
must be in the protectable "expression" and not just in the underlying
"ideas" of the two works. A work that copies only "ideas" and not the
way those ideas are expressed does not infringe the copyright because only
"expression" is protected by copyright. "Ideas" are considered to be in the
public domain.95
93. See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (there must be evidence
sufficient to infer that there was a reasonable possibility that defendant had access to plaintiff's
work); Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (evidence of opportunity
to see protected work is sufficient to establish access), aff'd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966);
Schwarz v. Umversal Pictures Co., 85 F Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (access not established if
no proof that protected work was actually seen by defendant); see also 3 M. NIMAER & D.
NnAMER, supra note 18, § 13.02[A] (arguing that it is more just to require a plaintiff to prove
only that a defendant had the opportunity to see the protected work rather than that a defendant
actually did see it).
94. See generally Cohen, supra note 92.
95. In the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988), Congress made this pnnciple part of the
statutory law by excluding from-the subject matter of copyright "any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery."; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (copyright extends to particular form of plaintiff's statuettes, but not to
idea of using statuette of human figures as lamp base); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104
(1879) (copyright protects author's explanation of bookkeeping method, but not method itself);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyright on play does
not extend to basic idea of lovers of different backgrounds and parental disapproval of their
relationship), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). The courts have used different procedures to
deterrmne if two works are substantially similar only in ideas or also in expression. In some
cases the courts first define the unprotected idea and then consider the nature of the similarities
between the two works. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hainway Int'l, 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d
Cir. 1983) (idea of superhuman muscleman defined before expression of toys compared); Eden
Toys, Inc. v. Marshall-Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1982) (idea of snowman defined
before considering similarities in parties' expression of that idea in toys); Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1971) (idea of jewel-encrusted bee
pin defined before expression in jewelry compared). In other cases the courts never address this
issue directly, but once finding access simply go on to compare the works to determine if they
are substantially similar. In these cases the courts seem to assume that the similarities are in
matters of expression. See, e.g., Kenbrooke Fabncs, Inc. v. Holland Fabrics, Inc., 602 F Supp.
151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (no discussion of idea-expression principle in comparing fabric designs);
Custom Decor, Inc. v. Nautical Crafts Inc., 502 F Supp. 154, 157 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (two
sculptures of duck heads considered substantially similar without any consideration of the
possibility that the idea of a duck dictates some similarities in expression).
In the Ninth Circuit, the courts follow the procedures outlined in Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). In that case the
court ruled that- after deternmng access, a court should engage in a two-step analysis to
determine substantial similarity. First, the court should compare the ideas in the two works to
see if they are substantially similar, using an extrinsic, analytic approach to do so. Then, if the
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Thus, within any copyrighted work, a line is drawn between those elements
that the copyright protects, the "expression," and those elements that the
copyright does not protect, the "ideas." In order to understand and evaluate
the scope of a copyright owner's interest in a copyrighted work, it is therefore
necessary to determine where courts draw the line between the protected
"expression" and the unprotected "ideas." A review of the philosophical
roots and the historical development of this doctrine reveals why courts
applying this doctrine today follow an approach that necessarily implicates
the courts in artistic evaluation of the works at issue.
1. The Roots of the Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The view that the "expression" in a work of art can be distinguished
from the "ideas" it expresses can be traced to Plato. For Plato, all art was
simply the imitation of ideas. There were two levels of such imitation: the
production of actual physical objects and the production of images. Both
levels of imitation, however, were lower forms of reality than the true essence
of the object, the "Idea" or "Form." The artist or artisan who tried to
imitate this "Idea" either by making an image of it or by making the actual
object, could never, in Plato's view, truly capture that essence, but only
imitate it on a lower level of reality 96 Aristotle also distinguished the artist's
work from the ideas it reflected. Aristotle believed that the artist or poet
should attempt to imitate the universal principles that exist in nature and in
human nature in order to educate society about these truths.9 7 Thus, a work
ideas are substantially similar, the court should compare the similarities in expression, using an
intrinsic, non-analytic approach to determine if the defendant took "so much of what is pleasing
to the audience" to be held liable. Id. at 1164-65. As applied, the Krofft test has often led
courts to label as "ideas" elements of the works that others would consider "expression" in
order to be able to compare those elements analytically. Compare Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736
F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1984) (court compared as "ideas" the basic subject of alien
stranded on earth and the sequence of events, dialogue, characters and mood of works to find
no substantial similarity in "ideas"), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985), with Universal City
Studio v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 1982 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,460 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (in
comparing E.T. character with doll made by defendant, court considered only the basic subject
of an alien character as "ideas" and found substantial similarity in "ideas" of two works).
Thus, the Krofft approach has led to even greater confusion about the distinction between an
idea and its expression. The court, moreover, does not explain why the works need to be
substantially similar in ideas if ideas themselves are not copyrightable. See Cohen, supra note
92, at 753-57. See generally Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56
TEN. L. Rnv. 321, 410-23 (1989) (author describes courts' tendencies to confuse idea-expression
and substantial similarity tests).
96. Plato used the example of a couch and defined the three levels as the idea of the couch
as a universal reality, the physical object of a particular couch made by the craftsman and the
painting of the couch's image by the artist. PLATo, Tin RPuBuc, supra note 55, at 277-81
Plato then wrote that "the mimetic art is far removed from the truth, and this, it seems, it is
the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of only a small part
of the object and that a phantom " Id. at 281.
97 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66:175
ARTISTIC VALUE JUDGMENTS
of art was viewed as distinct from a transcendental essence that could not
be captured or possessed but only imitated; in other words, what the artist
or author expressed was considered distinct from the underlying idea.
These classical views on the distinction between an "idea" and its "ex-
pression" had considerable influence m the early modem period although
the definition of "idea" was modified. For example, John Locke's discussion
of ideas reflects this distinction. For Locke, "idea" did not refer to some
absolute reality as it did for Plato, but to "the Object of the Understanding
when a Man thinks ... or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd
about in thinking. . ."9 These ideas were not innate, but derived from
experience and reflection. Locke, however, reflected Plato's influence by
distinguishing those ideas that exist in people's mind from the words and
language people use to express them. Locke believed that ideas must exist
before there'is a word that will become a sign for the idea, and that words
are only symbols used to commumcate ideas to another. As such, that
symbol's effectiveness is limited by the extent to which it signifies the same
idea to the listener as it does to the speaker. Underlying this discussion is
Locke's distinction between the conceptual, intangible idea and the words
and symbols people use in attempting to express those ideas. 99 Thus, for
Locke, intangible, conceptual ideas were distinguished from the tangible,
perceptible expression; every work of art reflected the artist's attempt to
convey an intangible, essential idea through some perceptible form of ex-
pression.
This conception of the nature of the creative process seemed to underlie
copyright jurisprudence during the nineteenth century. During the nineteenth
century and up through the first twenty years of the twentieth century, the
courts did not focus on a distinction between an "idea" and its "expression"
for purposes of determining copyright infringement. Instead, the critical issue
for courts determining copyright infringement was whether the defendant
had engaged in independent creation. 10° This can be explained in part by the
98. J. LoCKE, ESSAY ON HtumAr UNDERSTANDING, Book I, ch. I, § 8, at 47 (P Nittitch ed.
1975) (4th ed. 1700).
99. Id. at Book II, ch. I, §§ 1-9, at 104-08; Book III, ch. I, §§ 2-6, at 402-04; Book III,
ch. II-X, at 404-38; see also D. Huir, A TRA=TsE OF HumN NATuRE (1739) (L. Selby-Bigge
ed. 1965). See generally M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 55, at 173-75; D. O'CONNOR, JOHN LOcKE
60-62, 123-32 (1967); R. WOOLnOUsE, LocKE 45-55 (1983); Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellec-
tual Properly, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 311-12 (1988). The views of other neoclassical writers, such
as S. JoHNsoN, supra note 56, and J. REYNOLDS, supra note 57, reflect the view that art, by,
imitating nature, conveys the ideas of beauty and truth.
100. E.g., Daly v. Palmer, 6 F Cas. 1132, 1138 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552) ("The true
test of whether there is a piracy or not, is to ascertain whether there is a servile or evasive
imitation of the plaintiff's work, or whether there is a bona fide original compilation, made
up from common materials and common sources "); Green v. Bishop, 10 F Cas. 1128,
1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5763) ("rMhe main question is, whether the author of the work
alleged to be a piracy has resorted to the original sources alike open to him and to all writers,
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more limited definition of "idea" that was applied in copyright cases at this
time.
For example, in Holmes v Hurst'0' in discussing the general nature of
copyright in a case involving publication without notice, the Supreme Court
observed in dictum:
The right thus secured by the copyright act is not a right to the use of
certain words, because they are the common property of the human race,
and are as little susceptible of private appropriation as air or sunlight;
nor is it the right to ideas alone, since in the absence of means of
communicating them they are of value to no one but the author But
the right is to that arrangement of words which the author has selected
to express his ideas."2
or whether he has adopted and used the plan of the work which it is alleged he has
infringed "). As late as 1924, Judge Learned Hand wrote in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham,
298 F 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), that copyright infnngement will exist if one copies a plot from an
author who had independently created that plot, even though that same plot rmght have been
used in an earlier work. If the author's contribution was original to that author, even though
it might be considered an "idea," it was protected by the copyright. Id. at 150. Judge Hand
reasoned:
[O]nginality is alone the test of validity. Any subsequent person is, of course,
free to use all works in the public domain as sources for his compositions. No
later work, though original, can take that from Im. But there is no reason injustice or in law why he should not be compelled to resort to the earlier works
themselves, or why he should be free to use the composition of another, who
himself has not borrowed.
Id., cf. Bachman v. Belasco, 224 F 817, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (where defendant had no access
to plaintiffs protected work and wrote play similar to plaintiff's, using a common source, no
infringement was found, since creating a similar work is permitted, "provided one gets the idea
from the common source, not from the copyrighted play"); Johnson v. Donaldson, 3 F 22,
24 (S.D.N.Y. 1880) (although "[a]n artist cannot acquire such an exclusive right to the conception
embodied and expressed in his picture as to preclude others from the exercise of their own
creative genius," those others are only spared liability if their works were independently created).
Thus, even those elements such as old dramatic plots which courts today would consider
unprotectable "ideas" were considered, to some extent, protectable and could not be copied
from a protected work.
101. 174 U.S. 82 (1899). Interestingly, the unsuccessful plaintiff in this case was Dr. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr., Justice Holmes' father. Holmes, Sr., lost the case as a result of the
court's finding that he had published Ins work without notice, thereby forfeiting his copyright
protection. It is possible to speculate that Justice Holmes' essentially pro-copyright views may
be a reflection of his father's interests and experiences. See, for example, Holmes' opimons in
Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (playing copyrighted music m a restaurant is
performing work "for profit" and thus a violation of copyright owner's rights); Kalem Co. v.
Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (transforming book into movie is a violation of copyright
owner's right to dramatize the work); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo' Co., 209
U.S. 1 (1908) (Holmes, J., concurring) (copyright should not be limited to particular format in
which work appears, but should extend to intangible conceptualization); and United Dictionary
Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260 (1908) (publication of work in England without
American copyright notice did not forfeit copyright in United States). But see Louis Dejonge
& Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33 (1914) (each reproduction of design on gift wrap
required a separate notice of copyright; one notice per sheet was inadequate).
102. Id. at 86 (emphasis added); see also Johnson v. Donaldson, 3 F 22, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1880)
("A copyright secures the proprietor against the copying, by others, of the original work, but
does not confer upon him a monopoly in the intellectual conception which it expresses.").
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Thus, in this court's view an idea was an intangible, unexpressed concept
that existed only in the author's mind, a view reminiscent of Locke. The
copyright only protected the specific arrangement of words selected by the
author to express that idea.
Similarly, in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 03 the
Supreme Court in 1907 held that a perforated roll used to create the sounds
of a musical composition when placed in a player piano did not infringe the
copyright in the underlying musical composition because:
A musical composition is an intellectual creation which first exists in the
mind of the composer; he may play it for the first time upon an
instrument. It is not susceptible of being copied until it has been put in
a form which others can see and read. The statute has not provided for
the protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing pro-
duced, however meritorious such conception may be, but has provided
for the making and filing of a tangible thing, against the publication and
duplication of which it is the purpose of the statute to protect the
composer. °4
Here again, the noncopyrightable "idea" was the pure conceptualization not
existing in tangible form; the copyright only protected the particular form
in which that idea was expressed. 0 5 Once that idea was expressed in a
particular form or format, the copyright prohibited copying of the form or
format in which that idea was expressed. In White-Smith, however, because
a different medium was used, it was found that "expression" had not been
copied, but that only the unprotected "idea" had been taken.'
06
103. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
104. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
105. See Hopkins, Ideas, Their Time Has Come: An Argument and A Proposal for Copy-
righting Ideas, 46 ALB. L. REy. 443, 452 (1982) ("The idea underlying the words is said to be
analogous to the elements of matter, and such elements are said to exist in the mind alone and
no property interest can be claimed in them."). Hopkins recognized that in practice this
definition was not applied and that "ideas" were often blended with "expression" in deterrmnng
copyright protection, resulting in some limited protection of ideas. Hopkins would go further
than this and provide copyright protection to ideas themselves, defined by im to include "those
things that individuals denve from their expenence which have utility and are marketable in
the world of commerce." Id. at 452 n.50. This is obviously a far more restricted definition of
"idea" than generally used in copyright matters, where "ideas" include such non-utilitarian
items as literary plots and the subject matter of paintings. Within the limited definition of
"ideas" that he proposes, however, Hopkins would have Congress amend the copyright law to
extend protection to them, arguing that the traditional reluctance to protect ideas was appropriate
in an agrarian pre-industnal society, but not in our modem economy where skills, services and
intangibles are important assets. Although Hopkins' concern with the market value of ideas is
not a primary concern in this Article, his view does reflect the modern tendency to treat ideas
and expression as indistinguishable.
106. The outcome in White-Smith was consistent with the statutory law in effect at the time.
Prior to the 1909 Act, the copyright statutes provided only very limited protection against
transformation of a copyrighted work into a different medium. The first copyright statute, Act
of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, i Stat. 124 (repealed 1831), only provided to the authors of "any
map, chart, book or books" the sole rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"
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Thus, in these cases °17 copyright jurisprudence defined "ideas" and "ex-
pression" in ways that reflected a classical conception of the nature of the
such works, id. at § 1; protection was extended to prints in 1802, but the protection was still
limited to the rights described in the 1790 statute, see Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2
Stat. 171. Musical compositions were added to the list of protectable works in Act of Feb. 3,
1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, but there was no exclusive right of performance provided to the
copyright of such works, only the limited rights of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending.
These limited rights did not even protect the author against a translation of a literary work, as
Harriet Beecher Stowe discovered in 1853 when she was unsuccessful in suing the author of a
German translation of her book, UNcLE ToM's CAiN. The court reasoned that the "only
property which the law gives to [the copyright owner] is the exclusive right to multiply
copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes of another the
ideas intended to be conveyed." Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F Cas. 201, 206-07 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853)
(No. 13,514). When those ideas were translated by another into a different language, that
"particular combination of characters" had not been copied so no violation of the copyright
had occurred. "A translation may, in loose phraseology, be called a transcript or copy of her
thoughts or conceptions, but in no correct sense can it be called a copy of her book." Id. at
208.
Justice Holmes concurred in the outcome in White-Smith on these statutory grounds, but he
expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of a statute that so narrowly defined the limits of
copyright protection.
One would expect the protection to be coextensive not only with the invention,
which, though free to all, only one had the ability to achieve, but with the
possibility of reproducing the result which gives to the invention its meaning and
worth. A musical composition is a rational collocation of sounds apart from
concepts, reduced to a tangible expression from which the collocation can be
reproduced either with or without continuous human intervention. On principle
anything that mechanically reproduces that collocation of sounds ought to be held
a copy
209 U.S. at 19-20 (Holmes, J., concurring). Holmes' view that copyright should protect more
than the literal representation of the author's ideas in a specific tangible form is also reflected
in his majority opinion in Kalem, 222 U.S. 55, in which the court found that the copyright on
a book was infringed by one who used its story in a motion picture. See infra notes 112-14
and accompanying text.
107. Another influential case is the Supreme Court's 1879 decision in Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879). In ruling that blank account books could not be protected by copyright, the
court reasoned that copyright protection did not extend to the system or method of bookkeeping
which the plaintiff's book was written to illustrate, and that since this system could not be
used without using the arrangement of lines and headings that plaintiff provided in his book,
plaintiff could not claim copyright in those arrangements since to do so would grant plaintiff
a monopoly on the system as well. Id. at 103-04. The case is therefore often cited for the
proposition that copyright does not protect ideas. E.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217
(1954); Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th
Cir. 1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). See generally SAMUELs, supra note 95, at 326-30. The
Court's explanation for its conclusion that copyright did not extend to the underlying system
is interesting, however, for its limited scope: "To give to the author of the book an exclusive
property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially
made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent,
not of copyright." Baker, 101 U.S. at 102. The Court is thus not basing its reasoning on a
view that ideas by their very nature belong in the public domain, but, rather, on the differentiated
treatment intended by Congress in enacting the patent and copyright statutes. Moreover, the
kind of "idea" that the Court considered outside the scope of copyright is limited in this case
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creative process in which an artist attempted to convey an intangible "idea"
through perceptible forms of expression, such as words or symbols. Copyright
only protected those specific perceptible words and symbols; anyone was
free to use their own words and symbols, their own "expression," to convey
the underlying "ideas," as long as they did so independently. Because 'the
"ideas" existed in the abstract, they were not part of the creator's contri-
bution to the work and could be used by anyone. Only the particular forms
of expression that had been contributed by that creator could be protected
against infringement.
2, Romantic and Modem Views of "Idea" and "Expression"
and Their Impact on Copyright Law
The classical conception of the creative process and its distinction between
an idea and its expression was challenged during the nineteenth century by
art and literary critics and philosophers. As discussed previously, the Ro-
mantic view changed the way art and artists were perceived. 10 s Instead of
conceiving of art as imitating universal truths and ideas, the creation of art
was seen as a process that reflected the emotions and personality of the
individual artist. In addition, art was seen as a symbol of the human
unconscious. 9
To the extent that copyright jurisprudence had relied on the classical
distinction between an "idea" and its "expression," that jurisprudence was
to scientific, mechanical or utilitarian processes and inventions, not the more general notion of
"idea" used in more current copyright opinions to include dramatic plots or the subject of
pictorial illustrations. One author has concluded that in fact the idea-expression dichotomy
should only be applied to works such as those at issue in Baker. Note, Derivative Works and
the Protection of Ideas, 14 GA. L. REv. 794 (1980). This author distinguishes practical writings,
which convey information or explain systems or methods, from artistic writings that are valued
for their creative effort. The author reasons that the separation of an idea from its expression
makes sense with practical writings "[s]ince the ideas embodied in practical writings are subject
to practical application, [and] the right to use the idea means the right to employ it in actual
practice." Id. at 802. The author further argues that the application of this distinction to artistic
writing does not work and points to a number of cases reversed on appeal on the issue of what
is idea and what is expression as evidence to demonstrate the failure of this doctrine. Id. at
804-09.
108. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
109. Edward Lucie-Smith drew a distinction between the use of symbols as allegory in
Renaissance and post-Renaissance art and the use of symbols in the second half of the nineteenth
century.
The theorists of the Symbolist Movement [of the mneteenth century] recognized
that the symbol could be something which existed in its own right, diffusing a
mysterious influence around itself, and affecting the whole context in which it
was placed. In traditional allegory, on the other hand, it was assumed that
what the symbol stood for was something rationally decided in advance; symbolic
objects were therefore regarded simply as units of language.
E. LuciE-SmrrH, SYMBOLIST ART 16-18 (1972).
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threatened with obsolescence. If art was no longer viewed as the formal
expression of fundamental, abstract ideas, but rather as the expression of
the individual feelings of the particular artist, then the view that copyright
should protect only the author's specific way of expressing the ideas, but
not those fundamental, abstract ideas themselves, had lost its philosophical
basis. According to the Romantic view, the entire work could be considered
to reflect the individual personality of the artist. Therefore, more than just
the particular arrangement of words or visual characteristics should be
protected because the work as a whole reflected the emotions and individual
contributions of the artist.
By the middle of the mneteenth century, the copyright statutes began to
reflect a broader view of the creative process, as seen in the copyright statutes
of 1856, 1870 and 1891, in which Congress both enlarged the category of
works eligible for protection and expanded the rights provided to copyright
owners. 10 The real shift in the nature of the protection provided to copyright
owners, however, was first clearly manifested in the 1909 Act, in which
Congress recogmzed explicitly that an author had a cogmzable claim of
copyright infringement even when the purported infringer had transformed
the work into a different medium."' The copyright owner now could recover
110. In 1856, Congress slowly began to enlarge the nature of the copyright owner's rights.
In that year Congress expanded the scope of copyright to include dramatic compositions and
provided the owner of the copyright in such works with the "sole right also to act, perform,
or represent the same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or
public place " Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. Owners of copyrights in other
works were not given any additional rights, however, so that a dramatization or translation of
a book would still not constitute infringement. In 1870, Congress added many new categories
of works eligible for copyright, including paintings, drawings and statues, and provided the
owners with the sole rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing,
finishing, and vending the same; and in the case of a dramatic composition, of publicly
performing or representing" it, and for the first time, provided that "authors may reserve the
right to dramatize or to translate their works." Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16
Stat. 198, 212. This right to dramatize or translate a literary work did not become an
automatically-granted exclusive right until 1891. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1107.
Owners of the copyright in musical compositions were finally granted the right of public
performance in 1897. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (amending Title 60, ch. 3, sec.
4966 of the Revised Statutes). Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, Congress was
beginning to realize that an author needed to be protected against more than the literal copying
of the physical format in which the work appeared, but it was not until the 1909 Act that
Congress enacted a statute that more fully provided copyright owners with rights against those
who transformed their works into different media. See mnfra note 111.
111. The 1909 Act provided the copyright owner with the exclusive right to transform the
protected work into different formats, for example, to dramatize a nondramatic work and to
translate a literary work or "to make any other version thereof," Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch.
320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1175 (emphasis added), and with the right to perform works publicly;
dramatic works whether for profit or not and musical and nondramatic works if for profit. Id.
at §§ l(d), (e). The 1909 Act also specifically addressed the issue raised in White-Smith, 209
U.S. 1, and provided in § 1(e) that the owner of the copyright in a musical composition had
the exclusive right to "make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any
system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author may be recorded
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not only against one who used the particular words or visual characteristics
used in the copyrighted work, but also against one who took some elements
of the copyrighted work and created a work that transformed those elements
in some way, whether by changes in medium, format or otherwise.
The expansion in the scope of copyright is evident in some of the first
cases in which authors recovered against defendants who transformed the
copyrighted work into a different medium. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,t" 2
a case involving a defendant who had made a motion picture of the
copyrighted book Ben Hur, Justice Holmes upheld a finding of infringement
based on the author's exclusive right to dramatize his own work."' Justice
Holmes specifically rejected the defendant's argument that to find infringe-
ment here would extend copyright to "ideas" as distinguished from "ex-
pression," observing that "there is no attempt to make a monopoly of the
ideas expressed. '"" 4 "Expression" was clearly no longer considered limited
to the literal elements of the copyrighted work. This decision laid the
groundwork for subsequent cases in which a plaintiff claimed that a film
was an infringement of the expression in a literary work, in spite of the
change in medium." 5 Similarly, this broader conception of the scope of
copyright was also applied to copyrighted visual works that were transformed
and from which it may be read or reproduced " Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § l(b), 35
Stat. 1075 (emphasis added). Thus, in the 1909 Act, Congress began to recognize that copyright
protected the conceptual elements of expression and that this transformation into a different
medium or format could infringe that copyright. See generally Collins, Some Obsolescent
Doctrines of the Law of Copyright, 1 S. CAL. L. REv. 127, 139 (1928) (the author claimed in
1928 that the copyright principle that ideas were not copyrightable was obsolete because based
on the prior law with its limited protection of only literal expression; author argued that new,
more liberal statute did in fact protect ideas by protecting copyright owner against dramatiza-
tions, translations and abridgments).
The 1976 Act also specifically recognized that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to
"prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988). A
"derivative work" is defined as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Thus, under current law the
copyright is infringed whenever someone takes the copyrighted expression and transforms it
into a different medium in a way that is considered substantially similar to the copyrighted
work. See, e.g., Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986) (still photographs of
a ballet could be considered derivative work infringing copyright in choreography of the ballet,
if substantially similar). This broad right to control derivative works has been seen as evidence
that copyright does in fact protect ideas, at least in artistic works. See Note, supra note 107,
at 809-12.
112. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
113. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1107.
114. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 63.
115. E.g., International Film Serv. v. Affiliated Distribs., 283 F 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); see
also Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1933);
Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126 (S.D. Cal. 1927) (courts recognized the
potential for a film to infringe the copyright in a literary work, although they did not find
sufficient evidence to support a finding of infringement in these particular cases).
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by the defendant. In King Features Syndicate v Fleischer,116 the court held
that making a three-dimensional toy based on a copyrighted cartoon character
constituted infringement in spite of the change in medium.11 7
Thus, we have a recognition that what is protected by the copyright is
not limited to the particular form or medium or the literal words or visual
features, but that copyright protects elements of a work that are intangible
and conceptual. That is, to use the example at issue in White-Smith, a
musical composition is protected even when it is embodied in many different
forms and formats: sheet music, piano rolls, records, tapes and compact
discs. What is protected is not only the physical, tangible item which can
produce that musical composition, but the musical sounds themselves. Sim-
ilarly, with visual art works and literary works what is protected is not only
the precise format or medium used to display the art work or the specific
words with which a story is told, but also the conceptual and intangible
elements: the details and structure of that art work or literary work. Thus,
the copyright owner now could recover- for infringement in cases where
before the courts would have found that only ideas, but not expression, had
been copied. This new willingness to allow the creator to protect not only
the specific arrangement of words or the particular selection of visual
characteristics may reflect the Romantic view of the creative process as
organic and emotional, and of the whole work as a reflection of the
contributions of the individual artist.' 8
In the cases decided after these statutory changes were made in 1909, a
critical determination became whether the elements of the copyrighted work
that had been copied or transformed by the alleged infringer into the new
work were elements of the copyrighted work that the copyright, in fact,
protected. In deciding these cases, the courts continued to use the labels
"idea" to refer to features of a work that the defendant could use without
liability and "expression" to refer to those features that, if copied, could
result in liability For example, in 1913, the district court in Eichel v
Marcin1 9 reasoned that because free access to "ideas" is critical to the
development of creative works, a playwright who copied a plot from a
copyrighted work did not infringe the copyright as long as he or she did
not take the new embellishments added to the plot. The court reasoned:
116. 299 F 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
117 Id. at 538.
118. See Umbreit, supra note 35, at 947-51 (author ties expansion of copyright to "derived
products" to change to Romantic view of literature); cf. Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The
Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 14 UCLA L. Rxv 735, 743-47
(1967) (author tracks expansion in copyright protection from protecting only literal copying to
protecting works when transformed into different media, attributing that expansion to the
growing market for secondary uses of literary works).
119. 241 F 404 (S.D.N.Y 1913).
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If an author, by originating a new arrangement and form of expression
of certain ideas or conceptions, could withdraw these ideas or conceptions
from the stock of materials to be used by other authors, each copyright
would narrow the field of thought open for development and exploitation,
and science, poetry, narrative, and dramatic fiction and other branches
of literature would be hindered by copyright, instead of being promoted.120
Thus, the basic plot itself was an "idea" which the copyright did not prevent
others from using in creating their own works. The embellishments on the
plot, however, were "expression." Although the focus was no longer on
"expression" as tangible and "ideas" as intangible, as it had been, for
example, in Hurst,'21 the courts continued to use the labels "idea" to refer
to unprotected features and "expression" to refer to protected features.' 22
The continued use of the terms "idea" and "expression" to define the
scope of copyright in works of art became increasingly out of step with
evolving views of the creative process. Benedetto Croce, for example, wrote
in the early twentieth century that artistic creation is an intuitive process,
not an intellectual one, and that the essence of artistic activity is not the
production of an external physical object, but an internalized aesthetic
synthesis of impressions and sensations.' 21 In the 1930s, John Dewey wrote
that art is a reflection of and outgrowth of the experience of the artist
interacting with the materials used to make the art object. Dewey claimed
that during this orgamc, creative experience, the artist's emotions and ideas
are transformed and expressed as the artist works with the physical materials.
Thus, for Dewey there was no distinction between an artist's abstract idea
and the ultimate expression; rather, the work of art reflected the living
experience of the artist who created the work.' 24
120. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
121. 174 U.S. at 86.
122. In Roe-Lawton, for example, the court found no infnngement of the plaintiff's wild
horse stones by the defendant's film. Although the same theme was used in both works, the
court found no substantial identity m the protected details in the scenes and specific plot
incidents and concluded that those simnlanties that did exist "belong to the character of natural
and expected happemngs, considering the normal action of anmals and persons placed as the
characters are in the environment in which we find them." Roe-Lawton, 18 F.2d at 127.
Similarly, in Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1929), the court held that copyright
protection for a consolidated freight tariff did not cover the basic idea of such an index, but
only the particular ways in which the plaintiff had expressed that idea that were not necessitated
by the nature of the idea. On the other hand, in Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61
F.2d 131 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932), the court found infringement of the
plaintiff's copyrighted advertisement because the defendant had not only taken the unprotected
ideas, but also had copied aspects of the work considered expression: the illustrations, the
language used and the arrangements of the material.
123. B. CROCE, AEsnmIc As SCIENCE OF ExPR.EssIo AND GENERAL LiNGUsnc 1-19 (D.
Ainslie trans. 1909); see H. OsBomNE, supra note 55, at 222-23.
124. J. DEwEY, supra note 76, at 49-52, 56, 64-65. Dewey noted:
The act of expression that constitutes a work of art is a construction in time, not
an instantaneous emission. It means that the expression of the self in and
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These views have seen further development more recently in the work of
conceptual artists, who create art that sometimes has no permanent form
and in some cases does not exist in any form at all, other than in the
documentation used to describe it. Their belief that art need not have any
form at all as long as the artist has a conception in mind is a blatant
rejection of the notion that a line can be drawn in any given work of art
between the idea and its expression.25 Other contemporary schools of art,
such as minimalist art and found art, further illustrate the growing tension
between contemporary art and the idea-expression dichotomy as expressed
in the classical conception of art.126
In spite of these changes in the view of the creative process, courts have
continued to apply the labels of "idea" and "expression," resulting m
serious ambiguities in determinations of infringement. These ambiguities have
left the door wide open for decisions based upon assessments of artistic
value. 127
through a medium, constituting the work of art, is itself a prolonged interaction
of something issuing from the self with objective conditions, a process in which
both of them acquire a form and order they did not at first possess.
Id. at 65 (emphasis in onginal). Additionally, he stated:
The work is artistic in the degree in which the two functions of transformation
are effected by a single operation. As the painter places pigment upon the canvas,
or imagines it placed there, his ideas and feeling are also ordered. As the writer
composes in his medium of words what he wants to say, his idea takes on for
himself perceptible form.
Id. at 75.
125. Joseph Kosuth, one of the leading conceptual artists, rejected what he called the Formalist
tradition in art that defined art on the basis of form and structure, arguing that "[flormalist
criticism is no more than an analysis of the physical attributes of particular objects that happen
to exist in a morphological context. But this doesn't add any knowledge (or facts) to our
understanding of the nature or function of art." J. KosuTm, Art After Philosophy, I and II,
in IDEA ART: A CRmCAL ANmhoLoGy 70, 79 (G. Battcock ed. 1973). Kosuth claimed that the
physical objects were insignificant; what was valuable was what the art work contributed to the
conception and definition of "art." Id. at 77-83. According to Kosuth, "[airt 'lives' through
influencing other art, not by existing as the physical residue of an artist's ideas." Id. at 82.
Advance information about the concept of art and about an artist's concepts is
necessary to the appreciation and understanding of contemporary art. Any and
all of the physical attributes of contemporary works, if considered separately
and/or specifically, are irrelevant to the art concept. The art concept must
be considered in its whole.
Id. at 89. Based on this view of the purpose and nature of art, Kosuth and other conceptual
artists, such as Robert Barry, Douglas Huebler and Lawrence Weiner, have created art which
may be perceptible only through the documentation which describes it or not at all. See RosE,
Four Interviews, id. at 140-49; Jamieson, The Importance of Being Conceptual, 45 J. AEsmznrcs
& ART CmiTcisM 117-23 (1986).
126. See, e.g., Fowkes, A Hegelian Critique of Found Art and Conceptual Art, 37 J.
AEsTETics & ART CRTcIsM 157-68 (1978); Leepa, Minimal Art and Primary Meanings, in
MIM4AL ART: A CRrrICAL ANTHOLOGY 200-08 (G. Battcock ed. 1968).
127 Others have recognized that there is no objective way to distinguish an idea from its
expression. Robert Yale Libott wrote that the idea-expression dichotomy is "a semantic and
historic fallacy without meamngful application to the creative process, and that it results at best
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A review of some of the cases applying the idea-expression dichotomy to
works in the visual arts, that is, pictorial, sculptural and graphic works, and
in judicial anomaly and at worst in substantial injustice." Libott, supra note 118, at 736.
Noting the inconsistent treatment by courts of plot and characters, sometimes as ideas and
sometimes as expression, Libott concluded that there is no real definition of "idea" for copyright
purposes, but only a label applied by a court "as a ready means of demonstrating the court's
ad hoc decision that this plot, this theme, or these characters should not be granted the sanctuary
of the copyright laws." Id. at 740 (emphasis in original). Libott also pointed to the wide range
in the way the word "idea" is defined in leading dictionaries as an indication of why there is
no consistent application of that term by judges deciding copyright cases. For the limited
purposes of his discussion, Libott used a definition of "idea" as the "spine" of a dramatic
work or "the continuing directional force or structure to which each of the sub (or sub-sub)
components is connected, and from winch they radiate." Id. at 742. He then argued that as so
defined, the principle that ideas are not copyrightable is contrary to market realities where such
ideas are considered highly valuable, as demonstrated by the example of television formats
(written descriptions of the basic framework of a proposed television series). Id. at 755-61.
After showing the weaknesses of alternative theories available under state law to protect such
ideas, Libott concludes that "not only the idea-expression fallacy, but also the entire concept
of the non-protectability of ideas [should] be excised from the law of copyright " Id. at
769.
Other commentators have also recognized this problem. Professor Reichman discusses how
the courts use the idea-expression principle "in a heavy handed manner" to limit the scope of
copyright protection in articles of industrial design by finding a "thin" level of expression and
the copying of that expression by the purported infringer. Reichman, supra note 91, at 1234.
In discussing Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971), a
case which involved a jeweled bee pin, see infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text, Reichman
suggested that "[t]his court may have thought the design commonplace, in which case it was
in part grappling with the problem of the degree of creative content." Reichman, supra note
91, at 1234 n.476. Another author, focusing on the protection provided to commercially valuable
ideas under state law, observed that the line drawn by such state law between ideas considered
unprotected because too general and abstract and those ideas that were sufficiently concrete
and novel to receive protection was analogous to the line drawn by copyright law between
"idea" and "expression." Note, Beyond the Realm of Copyright: Is There Legal Sanctuary for
the Merchant of Ideas., 41 BRooKLYN L. Rnv. 284 (1974). The author found that the location
of this line was "incapable of exact determination, and obfuscated by the decisions which
have been rendered m tis area." Id. at 288. The author said that the inconsistency in results
in two cases applying this line to advertising ideas was explainable only by result-oriented
decisionmaking. The author concluded:
Characterization of ideas as 'abstract' or 'concrete' and requirements of 'novelty'
and 'originality' are meaningless criteria as prerequisites for recovery. The courts'
indulgence in such amorphous and undefinable terms merely confuses the issues
before the court and the rights and obligations of the party litigants. It is apparent
that decisions cannot be based upon words which neither the courts nor the parties
can adequately define. Nevertheless, the courts' use of such terms is ultimately
determinative.
Id. at 322. Although the author's focus is on state law protection of ideas, his comments are
equally relevant to the idea-expression dichotomy in copyright law.
Professor Samuels examined the idea-expression dichotomy and its flaws and concluded that
otlier copyright doctrines-principally, originality and substantial similarity-were far better
approaches to determining copyright infringement than the idea-expression dichotomy. Samuels,
supra note 95, at 462. He considered the idea-expression dichotomy troublesome because it
determined the lack of copyrightability of material in a work rather than simply having courts
conclude that work had not been infringed. Samuels, supra note 95, at 408-09. In this way,
according to Samuels, the idea-expression dichotomy was overly broad in its impact on the
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to fictional literary works, that is, books, plays and movies, reveals the
impact that artistic evaluation has had on these determinations. 2
B. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy Applied
1. Works of the Visual Arts
The idea-expression dichotomy has been applied both to two-dimensional
works of the visual arts, such as pictures, photographs and fabric designs,
and to three-dimensional works, such as sculptures and stuffed toys. Al-
though Judge Hand concluded in a case involving the alleged infringement
of a fabric design that it was obvious that "no principle can be stated as
to when an imitator has gone beyond the 'idea,' and has borrowed its
scope of copyright protection provided to works of authorship. See Samuels, supra note 95, at
462.
See also Kaplan, Implied Contract and the Law of Literary Property, 42 CAtrn. L. Rv 28,
32-33 (1954) (idea-expression distinction no longer clear now that copyright not limited to
protection only against literal copying, but also against transformation of a work into a different
medium); Meadow, Television Formats: The Search for Protection, 20 COPYRIGHT L. SYMp
(ASCAP) 73, 87-96 (1970) (as applied to television formats, idea-expression dichotomy is vague,
arbitrary and leads to ad hoc decisions by courts as to what should be protected; rather, courts
should analyze formats, looking for theatrical value based on dramatic potential, special, unique
elements or gimmicks, and completeness to determine line between protected and unprotected
television formats); Umbreit, supra note 35, at 944-45, 952-53 (author concludes that there is
no objective way to determine infringement); Note, Reading Copyright Cases: The Ad Hoc
Approach, 2 Comm/ENT 671 (1980) (metaphysical nature of subject matter at issue in copyright
necessitates an ad hoc approach where the attitudes and backgrounds of the judges affect their
decisions); Note, Derivative- Works and the Protection of Ideas, 14 GA. L. Rav 794, 800 (1980)
(idea-expression dichotomy should only be applied to works valued for conveying practical
information, not to artistic or literary works valued for creative effort where the application of
that principle "provides no guidance for the identification of the protectable as opposed to the
non-protectable elements"); Note, Copyright Protection for Mass-Produced Commercial Prod-
ucts: A Review of the Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. Cm. L. REv 807 (1971)
(author argues that as applied to mass-produced commercial products, the idea-expression
dichotomy has been manipulated by the parties and the courts to reach results based on external
factors, such as the business morality of the defendant); Recent Developments, 67 MIcH. L.
REv 167, 170 (1968) (author prefers the mathematical finiteness approach used in Morrissey to
the subjective approach used by courts through the idea-expression dichotomy, which the author
claims "is little more than a labeling technique applied to the results of particular cases"); cf.
Goldman, Observations on Copyright and Ideas, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv 574 (1969).
128. This issue has become even more difficult as courts have attempted to apply it in the
context of works such as computer programs. See generally Halvey, A Rose by Any Other
Name: Computer Programs and the Idea-Expression Distinction, 35 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP
(ASCAP) 1 (1989); Note, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in
Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REv 723 (1988). A discussion of
this area is beyond the scope of this Article.
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'expression, '1129 most of the opinions reflect an attempt to find such a
principle. The most important doctrinal point that has emerged from this
attempt to find a prncipled way to draw the line between an idea and its
expression is the notion that even where two works are nearly identical in
appearance, if those similarities m appearance are held to have necessarily
resulted from the defendant's use of the same idea as that used by the
plaintiff, there will be no infringement. Thus, the subject matter and those
elements which are necessary or commonly used to depict it are defined as
the uncopyrightable "idea" in works of the visual arts. 130
The court recognized, for example, that in Franklin Mint Corp. v. National
Wildlife Art Exchange: 3'
[I]n the world of fine art,, the ease with which a copyright may be
delineated may depend on the artist's style. A painter like Monet when
dwelling upon impressions created by light on the facade of the Rouen
Cathedral is apt to create a work which can make infringement attempts
difficult. On the other hand, an artist who produces a rendition with
photograph-like clarity and accuracy may be hard pressed to prove
unlawful copying by another who uses the same subject matter and the
same techmque. A copyright in that circumstance may be termed 'weak,'
since the expression and the subject matter converge. In contrast, in the
impressiomst's work the lay observer will be able to differentiate more
readily between the reality of subject matter and subjective effect of the
artist's work. 3"2
129. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Werner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). In trying
to determine if the copyright on the plaintiff's fabric design had been infringed, Judge Hand
concluded that "[t]he test for infringement is of necessity vague. Obviously, no pnnciple
can be stated as to when an m-itator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed
its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
Judge Hand reasoned that in comparing plaintiff's design with the defendant's alleged copy,
the court should consider the ultimate function of the design when used on an article of clotlung
and "how far its overall appearance will determine its aesthetic appeal when the cloth is made
into a garment." Id. Given that function, Judge Hand concluded that even though the patterns
were not identical, the similarities in color and in the shapes and symbols used in the pattern
were enough that the ordinary observer would "regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." Id.
Thus, Judge Hand seemed willing to concede that these determinations cannot be principled,
and in the end are based on how the works appeal to the tastes of the decision maker.
130. See infra notes 131-90 and accompanying text. This principle is often referred to as the
"merger" doctrine-that is, when the uncopyrightable idea necessitates the form of expression,
that form of expression must be treated as uncopynghtable as well because it merges with the
unprotectable idea. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 95, at 382-95. Samuels criticizes this theory
as rmsleading, since he finds that "true merger" rarely occurs, d. at 386-91, and as unnecessarily
broad in the way that it limits the scope of copyright protection. Id. at 391-95. In the latest
edition of Nimmer's treatise on copyright, the authors also argue that it would be preferable
not to treat the common elements that are considered necessary to express a certain idea as
uncopyrightable; rather, the authors suggest that the courts should consider this "merger"
factor simply as part of the defense to infringement in a particular case. See 3 M. NuIlR &
D. NnItmR, supra note 18, § 13.03[BI[3], at 13-58, 59.
131. 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
132. Id. at 65 (citations omitted).
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In other words, to distinguish the "expression" from the "idea" in a work
of visual art, the judge has to determine if a given theme or subject matter
by its very nature defines the way the artist has rendered it. An artist who
depicts something as it is actually perceived will have little in the work that
will be considered copyrightable expression. The artist who uses a nontra-
ditional or nonrepresentational style of depicting the basic subject matter
will have a stronger claim to copyright because the judge will not be forced
to conclude that the basic subject matter dictated that particular style of
expression.
What the courts have not generally been willing to recognize, however, is
that these determinations are based on the court's assessment of the artistic
value of the works at issue. First of all, the courts have considerable flexibility
in determimng how narrowly to define the underlying "idea" in a given
work; this definition is critical because it determines how much of the work
will be considered protectable expression and how much will be unprotected
by the copyright. As the cases discussed below indicate, often a court's view
of what constitutes the "idea" is influenced by how novel or creative the
court considers the works at issue to be; courts also seem influenced by the
relative commercial success of the works, their market value and the repu-
tations of their creators. Having defined the "idea," the court's second
deterrmnation, that is, how much of the expression used was dictated by
that idea, is determined also in part by the court's assessment of the artistic
value of the work. The determination that a particular work is life-like and,
thus, less an original work of the artist than one that has a distinctive style,
is a value judgment that reflects the judge's view as to what is "life-like"
and as to what constitutes a distinctive, and therefore copyrightable, "style."
In Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v Kalpakian,33 for example, the
plaintiff's copyright of a jewel-encrusted bee pin was held not to be infringed
by the defendants' nearly identical rendition of the same subject because
"[t]here is no greater similarity between the pins of plaintiff and defendants
than is inevitable from the use of jewel-encrusted bee forms in both."' 3 4 The
court observed that the pins "were life-like representations of a natural
creature"' 35 and relied on the defendants' testimony that the arrangement of
the jewels on the pin "was simply a function of the size and form of the
bee pin and the size of the jewels used.' ' 3 6 The court's willingness to
conclude that the arrangement of the jewels was "simply" a function of the
size of the jewels and the size and shape of the pin overlooks the fact that
use of those particular elements themselves reflects some individual choice.
That is, if the underlying idea had been defined as simply a "bee," then
133. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
134. Id. at 742.
135. Id. at 741.
136. Id. at 740.
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the choices of style, size, decoration and material could all have been
considered protectable expression that had been copied. The court's conclu-
sion that only the uncopyrightable ideas and the elements necessary to express
it were copied may have had to do with the defendants' "standing as
designers of fine jewelry"' 37 and the court's judgment that there was little
creativity involved in the plaintiff's design since it replicated the court's view
of a real bee and thus had little distinctive style.13 The court itself admitted
that, "[a]t least in close cases, one may suspect, the classification [of idea
and expression] the court selects may simply state the result reached rather
than the reason for it.' 39
A comparison of two cases involving toys representing human figures
further reveals how evaluations of style and commercial value and thus
assessments of artistic value affect definitions of "idea" and "expression."
In Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway International, Inc., 40 the court applied
the idea-expression dichotomy to two works, both expressing the unprotected
idea of "a superhuman muscleman crouching in what since Neanderthal
times has been a traditional fighting pose.' 141 The court reasoned that only
those elements not necessarily dictated by that idea could be protected, such
as "the particular form created by the decision to accentuate certain muscle
groups.' 42 Since those elements, that is, which muscle groups were accen-
tuated, were different in the two works, no copyright infringement was
found. 43 The court's conclusion that the "idea" here was a muscleman in
a traditional pose was essential to this conclusion. If using that pose itself
had been considered protected expression, the plaintiff might have been more
successful. The court's willingness to see that pose as an "idea" reflected
its view that the pose was recognized since "Neanderthal times" as "tradi-
tional," in other words, too common to receive copyright protection. This
137. Id. at 741.
138. Id., see also Reichman, supra note 91, at 1234 n.476.
139. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 446 F.2d at 742.
140. 724 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1983).
141. Id. at 360.
142. Id.
143. Id. Similarly, in Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff's
copyrighted stuffed toy dinosaurs were held not to be infringed by defendant's toy dinosaurs.
The plaintiff could have no copyright on the idea of a stuffed dinosaur or on those "elements
of expression that necessarily follow from the idea," id. at 901, meaning in this case that
plaintiff could not point to smilarities that arose "from either the physiognomy of dinosaurs
or from the nature of stuffed ammals." Id. Thus, the similarities in body shape and posture
and the similarities in the nature of the soft materials used were not similarities in protected
expression. Characteristics such as the distinctive stitching and distinctive facial features and
body shapes could be protected, but defendant's works differed with respect to those elements.
Id., see also Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982) (toy differed
in elements of expression not dictated by idea of snowman, for example, hats, feature size,
head shape and material).
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conclusion itself is a reflection of the court's view that the artistic value of
such toys is based on their novelty.'
On the other hand, in Quaker Oats Co. v Mel Appel Enterprse,1 4s the
court granted plaintiff's motion for a prelimnary injunction against the
defendant who was manufactunng dolls alleged to be infringements of
plaintiff's copyrighted dolls. Both dolls were almost the same size, about
five inches long, and made of material that enabled them to be squeezed
and concealed inside an adult hand. Both were made of similar silky fabrics;
both dolls had legs and arms that were outstretched and enlarged at the
ends. The clothing on both dolls was drawn on the bodies; the features of
the faces on both dolls were simply drawn, and both had half-moon smiles.
Defendant's dolls sold, however, for half, or less than half, of the price at
which plaintiff's dolls were sold. Although the court identified several
differences between the dolls, for example, in hair color, in hair styling, and
in detailing of facial features, the court found substantial similarity in
protected expression.
The Quaker Oats court rejected defendant's claim that only the ideas and
those features necessary to express those ideas had been copied.'46 The court
also distinguished Mattel by reasoning that unlike the basic idea of a life-
like human being in a fighting pose used in Mattel, in the case before it,
"plaintiff's work is not a version of a standard human form or a standard
doll form but an abstract work which is entirely original."' 47 The court's
determination that the Quaker Oats dolls were "entirely original" and
"abstract" works and not versions of a "standard doll," as were at issue
in Mattel, reflected the court's assumptions about and experiences with dolls
and its own assessment of the artistic value of such works, including their
"style" and commercial value. If the court had defined the "idea" of
plaintiff's doll more specifically to be a five-inch, squeezable doll with
144. To some extent, there seems to be an overlap between considerations of originality and
the idea-expression dichotomy in these determinations. That is, courts such as the Mattel court
seem to define the "idea" based on whether the way the subject matter has been expressed is
"original." If the mode of expression is well-known, then the author's use of that mode of
expression may not be "original," but making that determination of originality would require
an examination of the first author's creative process. As Judge Hand observed in Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936), "if by
some magic a man who had never known it were to compose a new Keats' Ode on a Grecian
Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem,
though they might of course copy Keats' " Id. at 54. To dismiss a mode of expression as an
uncopyrightable idea because it is considered common rather than having a specific, separate
discussion of the question of originality is clearly misleading. Simply because the court considers
a mode of expression to be "traditional" does not necessarily mean that the mode was not
original to the author seeking copyright protection. See also Samuels, supra note 95, at 426-38
(discussing onginality as a prerequisite for copyright protection).
145. 703 F Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).




outstretched arms and half-moon smiles, defendant might not have been
held liable.
The implication of artistic values that occurs when the judge defines what
he or she considers to be that underlying "idea" and then makes some
evaluation of the style of representation of the idea in the work is also
illustrated by two cases involving three-dimensional representations of dogs.
In both cases the court might have concluded that the underlying idea was
simply to depict a dog, and that any specific choice made by the creator in
depicting a dog was thus protectable expression to the extent not dictated
by the general idea of a dog. In both cases, however, the courts defined the
underlying idea more specifically. In Gund, Inc. v Smile International Inc., 1
48
the court defined the underlying idea behind plaintiff's stuffed toy dog as a
"more or less realistic, non-ngid stuffed toy dog that 'flops' down on its
stomach.' 49 Observing that it is "a common sight to see puppies act this
way" and that there are only "a limited number of ways" 150 to express this
idea, the court demed plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction because
it found that the defendant had only copied this idea of a floppy dog and
those elements essential to expressing it."' The court observed that "similarity
in expression is non-infnnging to the extent the nature of the creation makes
similarity necessary.' 5 2 Because the court refused to see the choice of pose
in the plaintiff's work- as "expression," the plaintiff was demed relief.
In contrast, the court in Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Genie Toys, Inc.53
granted summary judgment for the plaintiff where the defendant had man-
ufactured a stuffed dog in a train engineer's uniform that was nearly identical
to plaintiff's copyrighted work with respect to size, shape, color, eyes, nose,
mouth, other facial characteristics and clothing. 5 4 The mnnor difference in
skin tone and the elimination of a handkerchief used on plaintiff's toy were
not enough to overcome what the court found to be substantial similarities
in expression. The court rejected defendant's suggestion, that the similarities
were dictated by the common, unprotected idea of a dog in an engineer's
uniform, characterizing the argument as approaching "new heights in ab-
surdity."'' 5 The court reasoned that, "[w]hile such a phenomenon might
exist, it is hardly so common as to require the conclusion that this combi-
nation is common or somehow in the public domain."' 156 The court's reaction
to the subject matter as novel thus affected its refusal to treat that subject
148. 691 F Supp. 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd mem., 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989).
149. Id. at 645.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 645.
153. 491 F Supp. 526 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
154. Id.




matter as "idea." The court's attention to the fact that plaintiff's dog was
a commercial success and was "enjoyed by children and adults alike' 15 7 and
its observation that defendant's toy dog was "clearly a cheaper version of
that produced by plaintiff,"'15 may also indicate why the court was so willing
to treat defendant's argument that the similarities were based on the use of
the same basic idea of a dog in an engineer's costume as absurd. Thus,
because the court in Knickerbocker refused to define the unprotected "idea"
as "a dog in an engineer's costume," the plaintiff's toy dog in that case
was granted protection, whereas the court's willingness to define the idea
behind the plaintiff's toy dog in Gund as "floppy dog" resulted in a demal
of protection. The determination that a "floppy dog" is a common, unpro-
tected idea, but that a "dog in an engineer's costume" is not, is a value
judgment that reflects what that judge knows and feels about dogs, toys
and these stuffed toy dogs in particular. 5 9
Edwards v Ruffner'6° also indicates the way that personal experience and
values affect how restrictively courts define the "idea" and those elements
necessary to express it in any given work. In Edwards, plaintiff's copyright
in a photograph of a ballet dancer's lower legs posed in ballet's fifth position
was held not to be infringed by defendant's photograph of the same subject. 6'
The defendant's model wore different clothes on her legs, and the photograph
had been taken from a different angle and with a different overall presen-
tation and effect. 62 Although the court here explicitly observed that this was
not a case in which it was difficult to separate the "idea" from its
"expression," the court might have ruled that although the basic idea of
photographing a ballet dancer was not protectable, plaintiff's decision to
157. Id. at 527
158. Id. at 528.
159. In another case involving the artistic depiction of dogs, F W Woolworth Co. v.
Contemporary Arts, 193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951), aff'd, 344 U.S. 228 (1952), the First Circuit
said that "a copyright on a work of art does not protect a subject, but only the treatment of
a subject." Id. at 164. In the case before it, involving models of cocker spaniel dogs posed in
traditional show position, the court interpreted this to mean that the copyright would not
protect the subject of a cocker spamel model or the size, color or mafenals, or pose used
because those were elements of "subject" or "idea," but the copyright would protect the
proportion, form, contour and configuration of the models because those were original contn-
butions of the artist. Id. Because the defendant's work was substantially similar in proportion
and configuration, for example, in the configuration of the curls and folds of the fur on the
dog models, the finding of infringement was upheld, even though one model showed the dog
with long hair on its body and neck and the other showed it with short hair. Id. at 165. The
court's decision to consider the pose of the dogs, that is, the "traditional show position," as
part of the unprotectable "idea" is arguably a reflection of the court's judgment that the
traditional pose is so common that it should be treated as unprotected by the court. The court
may also have been influenced by the fact that plaintiff's dogs sold for prices up to $15,
whereas defendant's sold for $1.19.





photograph just the legs from the knee down, placed in fifth position, was
itself a particularized way of expressing an idea that the defendant had
substantially copied. The court's assessment of the work's artistic value based
on its feelings about and knowledge of ballet and photography, undoubtedly
affected how broadly the court was willing to define the unprotected idea
in that case.
Similar factors are reflected in Steinberg v Columbia Pictures Industries,63
where the court compared the plaintiff's poster of a New Yorker's view of
the world with the promotional poster defendant had used to advertise its
film, Moscow on the Hudson. There was no dispute as to the defendant's
access to plaintiff's very popular poster. In granting plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, the court found that although defendant was free to
use the idea of "a map of the world from an egocentrically myopic
perspective,"' 16 the defendant had gone beyond the idea and copied too
much of the plaintiff's particularized expression of that idea. 65 Both posters
showed four city blocks in detail in the foreground; in both, those blocks
were placed at the intersection of a wide two-way cross street and two
avenues. Such specific choices the court considered to be protected expression
as a reflection of the artist's original work. The court reasoned that "one
can hardly gainsay the right of an artist to protect his choice of perspective
and layout in a drawing, especially in conjunction with the overall and
individual details."'' Although the defendant had argued that such choices,
that is, of the perspective and the use of elements found in a typical city
intersection, were dictated by the use of the same idea, the court rejected
that argument. 67 In concluding that the choice of this particular perspective
was an element of expression, the court observed that "this is not an
inevitable way of depicting blocks in a city with a grid-like street system,
particularly since most l lew York City cross streets are one-way ",168 Thus,
the use of two-way streets as cross streets was considered protectable ex-
pression because it was not dictated by the reality of New York City's one-
way cross streets. Given the limited choices of using either two-way or one-
way streets, the court could as easily have concluded that this choice was
not protectable expression.
The court also found that the posters were similar in the use of a sketchy,
whimsical style. The court observed, "[e]ven at first glance, one can see the
163. 663 F Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
164. Id. at 712.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 713. The court also considered the many differences between the posters, for
example, the depiction of Moscow in detail in the background and the realistic likenesses of
the movie's stars in the foreground of defendant's poster, as not sufficient to eliminate the
substantial similarities in expression between the two posters. Id.
168. Id. at 712.
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striking stylistic relationship between the posters, and since style is one
ingredient of 'expression,' this relationship is significant."'' 69 The court's
willingness to assume that it could distinguish and identify the "style" used
in the poster and the court's comments on the plaintiff's fame and the
popularity of the poster70 reveal how its assessment of the work's artistic
value affected its decision. The court itself recogmzed the ad hoc nature of
its decision; the court observed that "[n]o rigid principle has been developed
to ascertain when one has gone beyond the idea to the expression,"' 7'
and quoting Judge Frankel, noted that '[g]ood eyes and common sense
may be as useful as deep study of reported and unreported cases, which
themselves are tied to highly particularized facts."' 1 72
The application of the idea-expression dichotomy to fabric designs also
reveals that assessments of artistic value may influence how broadly courts
will define the basic idea in a given work and the elements necessary to
express them. Thus, in Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v Holland Fabrics, Inc., 73
the court found substantial similarity between the plaintiff's and defendant's
fabric design of a double floral border with a field of flowers in the center,
even though there were differences in details and style, because the court
concluded that the ordinary observer would consider the two fabrics to have
the same aesthetic appeal. 7 4 The court did not address the possibility that
these similarities resulted from the use of the same idea. Yet, in Hedaya
Brothers, Inc. v Capital Plastics, Inc.,1 75 the court found no infringement
of plaintiff's fabric design depicting various types of fruit in mason jars
with a gingham check background by defendant's fabric design depicting the
same kinds of fruit in mason jars on a gingham check background.' 76 Noting
the differences in the shapes of the jars and in some minor details in how
the fruit was arranged in those jars, as well as some differences in color
and style, the court concluded that there was no infringement because the
copyright did not protect the idea of fruit in jars on a gingham background,
an idea the court considered "old hat."' 77 Rather, plaintiff's expression of
that idea, which the court considered to be of minimal originality, was not
substantially similar to defendant's expression of that idea.18 The court's
169. Id.
170. Id. at 708-09.
171. Id. at 712.
172. Id. (quoting Couleur Int'l Ltd. v. Opulent Fabrics, Inc., 330 F Supp. 152, 153
(S.D.N.Y 1971)).
173. 602 F Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y 1984).
174. Id. at 154; see also Imperial Textile Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Ametex Fabrics, Inc., 682
F Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y 1987) (plaintiff's fabric design of large petaled flowers and stems on
a solid background infringed by defendant's similar pattern even when different colors used).
175. 493 F Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y 1980).
176. Id. at 1023.




decision that the design of fruit in jars on a gingham background was only
"old hat" and thus an unprotectable idea is a reflection of the court's
assessment of the artistic value of the work at issue.
In E. Mishan & Sons, Inc. v. Marycana, Inc., 17 9 E. Mishan & Sons brought
an action for declaratory judgment against Marycana, the owner of the
copyright in refrigerator magnets made to look like traditional Americana
samplers.8 0 Marycana argued that the copyright had been infringed by
magnets made by the plaintiff. Both the copyrighted magnets and the alleged
infringing copies consisted of a square white card pasted onto a cardboard
square that was covered with a calico or gingham fabric with a fringe of
eyelet lace. On the white card a "homey" message was written in calligraphy
and an initation flower was glued. The copies differed from the copyrighted
magnets, however, with respect to the specific sayings, the flat rather than
gathered appearance of the lace, and the type of imitation flowers used. In
spite of these differences, the court found that Mishan had taken more than
the idea of a kitchen magnet made to look like an Americana sampler, but
had also "explicitly copied those aspects of [the copyrighted] work that were
the product of its independent authorship, including what might be called
the artistic details of [the copyrighted] work."' 8 1 The court noted that the
infringing magnet "looks like a cheap copy of [the protected work] with a
few changes made and a different saying, which is exactly what it is.' ' 82
The court concluded that there had been infringement of Marycana's cop-
yright in the kitchen magnets. 83 Thus, although one could argue that only
the idea of a magnet looking like an Americana sampler and those elements
commonly used to depict it had been taken here, as was found in Hedaya,
this court defined Marycana's idea more narrowly, leaving more of the work
to be considered protectable expression that had been copied by Mishan.' 4
Thus, the application of the idea-expression dichotomy to works of the
visual arts has required the court to identify the basic unprotected idea and
those details that are necessary or commonly used to depict that idea. Those
aspects of the work, that is, the idea and those elements that are necessary
or commonly used to depict that idea, are then considered non-copyrightable.
Only those details that reflect a personal choice of the artist, not dictated
by the choice of the basic idea, are considered to be protected by the
copyright. Each of these determinations, that is, th definition of the basic
idea and of those elements necessary to depict it, however, is a reflection of
the personal reaction of the judge to the style and novelty of the plaintiff's
179. 662 F Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
180. Id. at 1340.
181. Id. at 1345-46.
182. Id. at 1345.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1346.
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and defendant's works, the relative commercial value and success of the
works and the reputation of the creators of those works, reactions that
implicate the judge's subjective view of the artistic value of the works at
issue.
2. Literary Works
Judge Learned Hand's analysis of the idea-expression issue in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.' is probably the best place to begin a review of
the application of the idea-expression dichotomy to literary works. Consistent
with his later view expressed in Peter Pan Fabrics,'8 6 Judge Hand observed
in Nichols that there is no precise, predictable point where ideas end and
expression begins. In discussing whether the defendant's movie about lovers
from different religious backgrounds infringed the copyright in plaintiff's
play which involved a similar plot, Judge Hand reasoned:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about, and at times mght consist
only of its title; but there is a point in tis series of abstractions where
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent
the use of is "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property
is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and
nobody ever can."87
In other words, in t literary work, the copyright protection clearly extends
beyond literal repetition of the words used by the author, but Judge Hand
claimed that there is no precise way of defining how far that protection will
go."'8 As applied to the case before him, Judge Hand found that the
185. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
186. 274 F.2d at 489.
187. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (citations omitted).
188. Professor Chafee, using Nichols as an example, attempted to find a rational method
for separating an idea from its expression in the context of literary works. Chafee, Reflections
on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 CoLTuM. L. Rav 503, 513 n.24 (1945). Professor Chafee
proposed a "pattern" test in which the line between an idea and its expression, and thus
between non-liability and liability, would be crossed when the "pattern of a play-the sequence
of events and the development of the interplay of the characters"-was copied. Id. at 514.
Copying the basic idea was permissible, and since "some resemblance in characters and
situation is inevitable," id. at 513-14, that would be permitted as well. Professor Chafee did
not, however, provide any guidelines for finding this "pattern" or how detailed it needed to
be in order for it to no longer be considered an inevitable way of expressing the basic idea.
Nimmer and Nimmer, although recognizing that the problem of separating the idea from
its expression "is probably susceptible of no more precise principle than that of the Chafee
'pattern' test," 3 M. NBmOR & D. Nm R, supra note 18, § 13.03[A][I], at 13-27, attempted
to refine that test, commenting that "It]he pattern test, if correctly applied, offers a guide to
decision which avoids the abandonment of reasoned analysis implicit in the conclusion that
nothing more can be said than that each case turns on its own facts." Id. at 13-28. Nimmer
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similarities in plot between the two works were not enough to find that
protected expression had been taken. Even though both works involved a
relationship between a Jewish family and an Irish family, a secret marriage
between the son and daughter of these two families, a conflict between the
two fathers and an ultimate reconciliation, the plaintiff was not allowed to
prevail against the defendant for copying these elements because in the
court's view these similarities were "too generalized an abstraction from
what she wrote. It was only a part of her 'ideas." ' 8 9 The elaboration of
this general theme in defendant's work was found to be sufficiently different
from the elaborations in plaintiff's work to avoid copyright infringement.
As Judge Hand reasoned:
[H]er copyright did not cover everything that nught be drawn from her
play; its content went to some extent into the public domain. We have
to decide how much, and while we are aware as anyone that the line,
wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary, that is no excuse for not
drawing it; it is a question such as courts must answer in nearly all
cases. 190
In this case, the court found that the defendant had not crossed the line
between idea and expression in creating a work with a similar plot structure
and Nimmer illustrated this "reasoned analysis" by applying the pattern test to compare
Romeo and Juliet and West Side Story. Considering it "clear that anyone could borrow the
'idea' of a romance between members of two hostile families," id., Nimmer and Nimmer then
identified thirteen similarities in the sequence of events that occur in each work and concluded
that "[t]hese thirteen points are sufficiently concrete to state the essential sequence of events
and character interplay in each of the two works." Id. at 13-29 to 13-30. Thus, infringement
should be found, even though there were other details and important story points that differed,
as well as differences in dialogue, setting and characterization. Nimmer and Nimmer recognized
that not all courts would agree that these similarities constituted a "sufficiently concrete
expression of an idea" to result in a finding of infringement, but Nimmer and Nimmer criticize
those courts that consider "plot" as equivalent to "idea" instead of applying the "pattern"
definition of a plot, that is, "the sequence of events by which the author expresses his 'theme'
or 'idea,"' id. at 13-31 (quoting Shipman v. RKO, 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938)), and
treating it as expression. Nimmer and Nimmer do not discuss how a court is to decide whether
particular plot incidents are included as essential to the structure of the plot and thus how
much of that plot must be copied before the copier will cross the line between an idea and
its expression. Nimmner and Nimmner seem to agree with the outcome in Nichols, even though
one could find some basic similarities in the sequence of events used to express the idea. 3
M. NMMR & D. Nnmlrt, supra note 18, at 13-28 n.26. See generally Libott, supra note 118,
at 751-52. Thus, even those who have attempted to find a rational method for distinguishing
an idea from its expression in the context of literary works have not avoided the fundamental
problem that every such determination is ultimately grounded in some subjective reaction to
the merits of the work.
189. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122; see also Dymow v. Bolton, I1 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926)
(plot as "the mere concept of a situation around which to build and develop literary adornment
is not copyrightable"); Giangrasso v. CBS, Inc., 534 F Supp. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (radio
script not infringed by television show where both used idea of a radio show being broadcast
from a remote location that is interrupted by a hold-up, but. where the emphasis, story line
and characterization were very different).
190. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122.
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and similar characters. Thus, the "idea" in a literary work is not limited to
the basic subject matter, but includes some of the details used to develop
and convey that subject matter. On the other hand, at some point certain
details are considered "expression" and are protected from copying.
The difficulties that Judge Hand recogmzed in drawing the line between
those details that are unprotected as part of the idea and those details that
are protected as part of the expression in literary works are evident in other
cases. 19' For example, in Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v Stonesifer,192
the court found substantial similarity between plaintiff's play and defendant's
movie where both told the story of a young woman.moving into a residential
hotel for women in New York City In both works, the woman is almost
seduced by an older man and is shot at by the man's jealous lover. 93 In
spite of the fact that there were several plot differences between the two
works' 94 and the fact that many of the similarities in character and plot
could have been considered to have evolved necessarily from the basic plot
idea and locale, 9s the court, citing Nichols, concluded that the movie
infringed the play? 96
191. The easiest cases are those like Becker v. Loews, 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 772 (1943), where the plaintiff's work was an essay on the economic and political
problems of the 1930s, with a special emphasis on the impact of such problems on young
people. Plaintiff claimed that defendant's movie about the economic struggles of a young
couple during the 1930s infnriged his copyright. The court held that there was no liability
because the similarity between the two works was limited to the basic idea of the problems
faced by youth dunng the Great Depression. Id. at 892-94. Plaintiff's book was an essay with
no characters, story line or dialogue, whereas defendant's work was a traditional movie with
characters, plot, romance and dialogue. In this case there was similarity only in idea, not
expression, because there was no similarity in the way the basic theme or idea was presented.
Id.
A less clear case is presented in Musto v. Meyer, 434 F Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y 1977), aff'd
mem., 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979), where plaintiff was the author of an article which appeared
in a psychology journal. The author included in his generally scientific discussion of cocaine
use a fictional sketch about Sherlock Holmes' use of cocaine and his cure of this addiction
through Freudian methods. Even though the basic idea of this sketch and all the key incidents
of the plot were used in defendant's book, the court found no infringement, reasoning that
these were similarities of idea only and that the differences in audience appeal, plot delineation
and literary skill were sufficient to deny a finding of infringement. Id.
192. 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944).
193. Id. at 581.
194. Id. For example, in plaintiff's play, the young woman is brought to the city by her
father and returns home to her family. In defendant's movie, the young woman comes to the
city alone to be near her boyfriend. The boyfriend at first rejects her, but ultimately realizes
his love for her after she is endangered. In the end, she stays with the boyfriend. The court
did not address these thematic differences or how they should be treated, but did comment
that many of the other differences between the works could be attributed to the differences
between live theater and film. Id. at 583.
195. One could claim that the similarities in character-a worldly actress, an unemployed
actress, a model, an innocent young woman from a small town, an evil man interested in
seducing the young woman, and hotel employees-are either obvious characters one would
find in a New York residential hotel or characters essential to the unprotected basic plot idea
of the dangers facing an innocent young woman moving to New York City.
196. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d at 584.
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It seems difficult to reconcile these two cases on any basis that relies
entirely on some abstract line between an idea and its expression. In Nichols,
both works were based on the idea of star-crossed lovers from families of
different religious backgrounds; in Stonesifer, both works were based on the
idea of a young woman living in a New York City residential hotel. In both
cases, the essential .structures of the stones told in the two works were
similar: in Nichols, both works told the story of a secret marriage between
the lovers, a conflict between the fathers, the birth of grandchildren and a
family reconciliation; in Stonesifer, both works told the story of the young
woman's arrival in New York, her relationships with residents of the hotel,
an evil man's attempt to seduce her, a threat by the man's jealous lover
and her ultimate recognition of the dangers of the city. In both works there
were also many thematic, plot and character differences. Despite the fact
that in both cases the two works at issue arguably had very comparable
degrees of similarity and of difference, in Nichols no infringement was found
because the court concluded that only unprotected material had been taken.
To the contrary, in Stonesifer, the court concluded that there were sufficient
similarities in some of the details used in the works to find infringement;
and although it cited Nichols m support of its conclusion, the Stonesifer
court never considered whether those similarities derived from the use of the
same basic idea.
Although it is possible to dismiss the differences in outcome as a reflection
of the Stonesifer court's careless reading of Nichols, it is also possible that
the court's determination in Nichols that the similarities were unprotected
reflected the court's view that stones of star-crossed lovers are too common
to be protectable, whereas perhaps the court in Stonesifer found the story
of a young woman living in a New York City residential hotel to be novel
and creative enough to merit broader protection. The more established and
"old hat" the basic idea seems to the decision maker, the more likely the
details that express that idea will also be considered too established and "old
hat" and thus unprotectable. This decision, that some plots are so common
as to be unprotectable ideas, whereas others are still novel enough to be
protectable expression, may be rooted in what the judge knows about and
values in literary works.
Similar questions are raised when we compare Stonesifer with Reyher v.
Children's Television Workshop.'9 In that case, the Second Circuit upheld
a dismissal of the plaintiff's claim where defendant's magazine story told
the same basic story as the plaintiff's copyrighted book: a child who is
separated from his or her mother describes the mother as "the most beautiful
person in the world"'' 9 to someone who offers to help find her. Many
197. 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
198. Id. at 92.
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beautiful women are brought to the child, but none is the mother; finally,
a plain woman appears, and she is the child's mother. Recognizing that
"[t]he difficult task in an infringement action is to distill the non-protected
idea from protected expression,"' 99 the court focused on the different settings,
the different moral emphasis of each story and the fact that plaintiff's work
had far more textual detail in finding no basis for infnngement.? The court
also concluded that the similarities between the plot incidents could be
explained as those that "necessarily result from identical situations."' 1 Thus,
the court concluded that "[s]ince both present only the same idea, no
infringement as to protected expression occurred. ' '202
Both Stonesifer and Reyher involved relatively simple stones that are very
similar in basic structure, but different in details, thematic emphasis and
language. In fact, in terms of overall plot and character, there are more
variations between the two works in Stonesifer than there are between the
two works in Reyher, yet there was infringement of protected expression
found in Stonesifer and not in Reyher If the characters and plot details in
Reyher were a necessary consequence of the basic idea, it is not clear why
the same cannot be said of Stonesifer
A comparison of other cases leads to further muddying of any clear line
between an idea and its expression. In Litchfield v Spielberg, 20 the lower
court had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, whose
movie, E.T., was alleged to be an infringement of plaintiff's play, Lokey
from Maldemar Both works concerned friendly aliens who were stranded
on earth and who befriended a young child. In both stones, the alien had
telekinetic powers and supernatural healing powers. In both plots, the child
199. Id. at 91.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 92. This principle is often referred to as the scenes a faire doctrine, that is, the
notion that certain similarities in basic plot will require similarities in the scenes and incidents
used to develop that plot. E.g., See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983); A.A.
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980); Reyher, 533 F.2d 87; see also Schwartz v. Umversal Pictures Co., 85 F Supp.
270, 275-76 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (application of scenes a faire doctrine to work not protected by
federal copyright but by common law). The doctrine has been criticized by one author as
lacking uniformity and continuity and as overused by defendants; that author concludes that
some of these inconsistencies are due to the fact that judges may not have the same
understanding as to what is common to a certain genre or motif. Note, Copyright Infringement:
An Argument for the Elimination of the Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 5 Comm/ENT 147 (1982);
see also Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 U. FI.A. L. REv. 79 (1989) (scenes
a faire doctrine is considered by author as a useful tool to determine substantial similarity,
but author concludes that treating scenes a faire as uncopyrightable may be unnecessary); 3
M. NIM R & D. NmtrmR, supra note 18, § 13.03[B][4], at 13-61 (footnotes omitted) ("Labeling
certain stock elements as 'scenes a faire' does not imply that they are uncopynghtable; it
merely states that similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's works that are limited to
hackneyed elements cannot furnish the basis for finding substantial similarity.").
202. Reyher, 533 F.2d at 92-93.
203. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984).
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taught the alien a little about human culture and about love. Both stones
ended with the aliens going home. In spite of these similarities, the plaintiff
was demed a trial, and summary judgment for the defendant was affimed. °
The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no substantial similarity m mood,
dialogue, characters or sequence, and that those similarities that did exist
were "only at the general level for which plaintiff cannot claim copyright
protection." 205 It is arguable, however, that plaintiff's unprotected idea was
the basic subject of an alien stranded on earth, and that the plaintiff's
particular story of what happened to the alien stranded on earth was all
protected expression and that the various similarities in detail between
plaintiffs story and defendant's-for example, the alien's telekinetic and
special healing powers, the befriending of a single parent and children, the
exposure to human emotions and human culture-are details not necessarily
predictable from that subject matter and thus protectable.
Although there were also significant differences in the details of the two
alien stones,2 such differences have not always been enough to defeat a
claim of infringement in literary works. There were many differences, for
example, between the works at issue m Stonesifer, where infringement was
found, and also in MacDonald v. DuMaurter,2°0 where the Second Circuit
found sufficient allegations of similarities to justify reversing the grant of
the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. 208 In that case, the
plaintiff claimed that her novel about a young woman who became the
second wife of an older, wealthy man, had been infringed by defendant's
novel, Rebecca.20 In both works, the new wife was bothered by the seermng
continuing influence of the first wife over the husband, the servants, the
house itself, and the husband's friends.210 In both works the second wife
considered leaving the husband, but ultimately learned that the husband truly
loved her and had not loved the first wife.211 Some of the more particular
details of the story also appeared in both works, for example, gifts of hair
brushes, a book with the first wife's handwriting, an incident with a mirror,
and the first wife's use of a pet name for the husband. 2 2 For purposes of
the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court considered these
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1357.
206. Plaintiff's play was a musical; there were two aliens, not one; the child they befriend
was a girl living with her brother and father at a research center on the North Pole, not a
boy living with his brother, sister and mother in suburban America; the aliens cure the father,
not a flower or a cut finger, as in E.T., the aliens go to Japan and elsewhere and meet a
witch before leaving earth. They do not almost die, nor does the child, as occurred in E.T.
207. 144 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1944).
208. Id. at 701.
209. Id. at 697.
210. Id. at 698-99.
211. Id. at 697-98.
212. Id. at 699.
1990]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
sufficient similarities in protected elements of the plaintiff's work to withstand
the defendant's motion, even though there were several, very significant
differences in plot, characterization, theme, and endings of the two works.
213
Although the court seemed primarily concerned with the premature nature
of the proceeding, the court, assumng the truth of the allegations of access
and copying for purposes of the motion, reasoned:
In the case at bar the suppositious borrowings are not in the general
outline of plot and character: in "ideas" as opposed to "expression."
On the contrary they consist in a series of concrete incidents and details,
and if in fact these were all borrowed from the plaintiff, we cannot
properly hold that the common matter was outside the protection of the
copyright law 214
It is not easy to understand why these similarities were enough to defeat
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings in MacDonald, but the
similarities between the works at issue in Litchfield (for example, levitation
of objects and special healing powers) were not enough to defeat that
defendant's summary judgment motion. In both cases, it was assumed, for
purposes of the preliminary motions, that the defendants had access to the
plaintiffs' work, 215 and both cases appear to involve works that are essentially
quite different in plot, character and theme, yet the outcomes of the
prelimnary motions in the two cases were different.
At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which it seems clear that
the line between an idea and its expression has been crossed because so
much of the plot, character and theme (or feel) of a work have been taken.
For example, in Universal City Studios v Film Ventures International, Inc.,
216
the owner of the copyright in the hit movie Jaws was granted a preliminary
injunction against the defendant who had produced the movie Great White.217
The court found that there was a significant likelihood that the plaintiff
would prevail on the merits given the substantial similarity not only in the
general idea of each movie-an Atlantic Coast town terrorized by a great
white shark-but in the basic story line, the sequence of events and the
development and interplay of the major characters. 21 8 The court identified a
213. For example, in plaintiff's novel, the second wife never loved the husband, but married
him to win a bet; she was, in fact, in love with another man. The husband was a violent,
bad-tempered man who threatened her. After he died, she was reunited with her first love. In
Rebecca, the second wife is truly in love with the husband, who is a gentle, patient man who
never threatens her. She learns that the husband had murdered his first wife because she had
been unfaithful and cruel; the husband is arrested, but eventually exonerated, and the two go
on to live their lives together. Id. at 697-99.
214. MacDonald, 144 F.2d at 701. After a trial on the merits, the distnct court had ruled
that plaintiff had not proven that defendant had access to the copyrighted work and thus
could not prove infringement. MacDonald v. DuMaurier, 75 F Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y 1948).
215. See MacDonald, 144 F.2d at 700; Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1355.
216. 543 F Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
217 Id.
218. Id. at 1139, 1142.
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long series of plot and character similarities. These included conflicts between
surprisingly similar main characters including a local politician more con-
cerned with tourism than safety and a salty skipper with an English accent
out to capture the shark. The court also noted a number of similar scenes
which included nearly identical opening scenes in which a shark attacks while
teenagers play on the beach as well as scenes in which sharks knock victims
off boats, fishermen are found dead in boats, children are injured, politicians
apologize, and similar final scenes in which the sharks swallow fatal explosive
devices after eating the skippers. 219 The court rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that these scenes necessarily grew from the unprotected basic idea
and found that these were similarities in expression that would be considered
substantial by the ordinary observer.m°
Although this conclusion seems correct, the defendant's argument is not
entirely frivolous. The court might have concluded that the similarities m
the basic plot structure grew naturally and necessarily out of the basic idea
of a shark terrorizing an Atlantic coast town. Even at the next level of
detail, it can be argued that a conflict between a hero out to capture the
shark and a villain who is indifferent is also a common way of developing
that basic idea. If all those similarities-that is, in basic idea, in the core
structure of the plot and in the conflict between a hero and a villain-could
be considered unprotectable, then many of the other similarities could be
considered just common or necessary ways to develop those unprotected
elements. For example, that the hero would be a skipper of a boat and that
the skipper would have an English accent and be "salty" hardly seem like
original details.?'
219. Id. at 1137-39.
220. Similarly, in Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th
Cir. 1983), the thirteen plot details identified by the court as common to both the plaintiff's
film, Star Wars, and defendant's Battlestar Galactica, were considered sufficient evidence of
similarities in expression at least to provide plaintiff with an opportunity for a tnal and thus
to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment. The similarities included the following:
both works were about a war between a galaxy's democratic and totalitarian forces; the hero
in both was the son of a leader of the democratic forces; the leader was a wise and mystical
man; their heroine is imprisoned; a planet is destroyed; a friendly robot is injured; there is a
romance between the heroine and the hero's friend; there is a scene with weird creatures in a
bar; the totalitarian headquarters are attacked and the movies both end with an awards
ceremony. See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op Prods., Inc., 479
F Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (musical-comedy condensed version of Gone With the Wind
using different names and different dialogue held to be an infringement by use of same
settings, characters, situations and story line); cf. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) (where defendant had right to use Tarzan character but not story
in plaintiff's book, no infringement found where, though basic outline of story was very
similar, court considered differences in perspective, emphasis and incidents sufficient to find
no substantial similarity in expression).
221. With respect to fictional characters, it has been recogmzed that there is a conflict
between an author's right to control the use of the characters they create and other authors'
needs for access to characters that are part of our culture. "Every artist builds upon the
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Thus, as with the application of the idea-expression dichotomy to works
of the visual arts, the application of that rule to fictional literary works
often requires courts to determine what aspects of a given work are natural
or necessary outgrowths of the use of the same basic idea. The plot details
or characterizations that seem to be common or essential ways of expressing
that basic idea are not considered copyrightable and can be freely used by
others. On the other hand, those details such as specific choice of words or
plot incidents and characterizations not dictated by the basic idea are
considered protected expression and, if substantially copied, will result in
liability for copyright infringement.
Each of these decisions, however, reflects the judge's view of the artistic
value of the works at issue based on what the judge knows about and values
in literary works on that subject. E.D Hirsch, Jr. described how people use
their past knowledge and experiences to interpret what they are reading.22
He described the way people learn to classify and associate certain facts
through their experience and education so that they create various schema
or prototypes that they use to interpret language. Hirsch indicated that the
substance of these schema varies, depending on the particular background
and experience of the individual; he described as an example a study that
showed how the word "bird" had different associations for Australians than
it did for Amencans.m2 By extension, one could argue that when a judge
tries to extrapolate the "idea" from the "expression" in a literary work, his
or her judgments as to what is necessary to express a given idea will reflect
the particular background knowledge and associations of that judge, as a
reader of language and works of his or her literary culture. That is, any
determination that a specific detail in plot or character is itself an idea or
the necessary outgrowth of an idea is a determination based on the decision
maker's judgment as to the originality of that detail: is it so common and
predictable that it does not merit protection, or is it new enough or personal
enough that the author deserves copyright protection?
creativity of the past, and the creations of others are among the raw materials used to create
new works of art." Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis.
L. REv 429, 438. Kurtz argues that "[o]nly the copying of distinctive and well-developed
qualities constitutes copying of expression rather than ideas. If the use of broad or
stereotypical qualities were considered infringement, lists of human characteristics would be
withdrawn from the pool of what authors need to create fiction." Id. at 463. Kurtz proposes
a two-part determination, first separating the ideas from expression and second, determining
if the defendant has taken so many of the protected character traits that his or her character
is recognizable as taken from the plaintiff's character. Although Kurtz recognizes that "the
law does not possess the tools to distinguish great art from trash," id. at 438, the test that
she proposes for courts to determine copyright infringement of literary characters would, in
fact, involve the law in making such distinctions without the tools. Deciding if a quality is
too "broad or stereotyped" and thus an unprotected idea is itself a judgment about the
worthiness of the character that has been created.
222. See E. HmscH, supra note 89.
223. E. HIRSCH, supra note 89, at 48-60.
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As with works of the visual arts, another factor that affects a court's
determination of where to draw the line between idea and expression in a
given case involving literary works is the relative commercial success of the
works at issue and the reputations of their creators. In Universal City
Studios, for example, the court mentioned the enormous success of Jaws
and its commercial value.3 4 These factors may have affected the court's
decision finding so many aspects of the film protectable. Likewise, when
one considers the case against Spielberg's E.T.,22 the most successful film
of all time, one has to wonder whether Spielberg would not have had better
luck suing the author of Lokey, if he had been the plaintiff claiming that
the play infnnged his copyright in E.T The fact that the plaintiffs play
was not well-known and that the defendant's movie was a commercial
blockbuster may very well have had some impact on the court's willingness
to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. 227
C. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy Unmasked
Looking back over the summary of the way the idea-expression dichotomy
has been applied to fictional literary works and works of the visual arts,
one can make some general observations about the value of this principle.
In the context of both types of work, the critical determinations for defining
the line between protected and unprotected aspects of a given work are,
first, the determination of what is the basic idea or subject matter and,
then, a determination of what aspects of the work are necessary or common
ways of developing that idea and are thus unprotected. The determination
that a second work is similar only in idea and not in expression is thus
easiest when the first artist or author has created a work that is rich in
224. 543 F Supp. at 1136 (court found that the movie had been exhibited "throughout the
United States and the world to millions of members of the public"). Id. at 1139 ("The
properties 'Jaws' and 'Jaws 2' have great value. Universal has derived substantial revenue in
the past from these properties, is continuing to receive substantial revenues now, and expects
to continue receiving substantial revenues in the future from these properties.").
225. Litchfield, 736 F.2d 1352.
226. Id. at 1354. The trial court had found that "[dlespite repeated efforts to find a receptive
buyer for her works, plaintiff failed to find success in Hollywood." Id.
227. The relative fame and success of a given work and the scope of its circulation, are, of
course, relevant to the determination of access. The more well-known the plaintiff's work is,
the more reasonable it is to infer that the defendant saw or had an opportunity to see that
work. Compare, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1984) (limited distribution of
plaintiff's song a factor in finding no proof of access) with Abkco Music Inc. v. Harnsongs
Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983) (fact that plaintiffs song was a number one
hit considered as a factor in finding defendant's access to that song).
These two factors should have no beanng, however, on the determination of substantial
similarity in which the issue is whether so much expression has been copied that the defendant




particularized details that are not necessarily dictated by the basic idea or
subject matter, and the second artist has not copied those particularized
details. Conversely, the determination that expression has been copied is also
easiest in those cases involving works nch in particularized details that are
not necessarily dictated by the basic idea, if the second artist has, in fact,
copied those particularized details.
In most cases, however, that determination is not simple because there
are no defined, objective criteria for deciding whether a particular detail is
dictated by the subject matter or a common way of expressing the basic
idea and therefore unprotected. A review of the cases has revealed that this
critical determination is little more than a determination of what is considered
meritorious in a given work, based on particular judges' assessments of the
artistic value of works, including their assessment of the style, novelty and
commercial value of those works and the reputation of their creators. This
assessment, in turn, is a reflection of what a particular judge knows about
and values in such works.
Thus, the determination of the line between an idea and its expression in
a given work is a determination that reflects the values of the particular
judge who is judging the works at issue. The line between an idea and its
expression, and therefore the line between liability and non-liability for
copyright infringement, are thus lines drawn on the basis of assessments of
artistic value determined by "persons trained only to the law," the very
thing warned against by Justice Holmes. " 8
CONCLUSION
We started with the assumption that it would be best if copyright deter-
minations, including determinations of infringement, could be made without
regard for the artistic value of the works at issue. This assumption was
based on the view that determinations of artistic merit inevitably reflect the
subjective values and experiences of those who make them and that therefore
there can be no objective determinations of artistic merit. Thus, if copyright
determinations were made on such a basis, the existence and value of a
copyright would be dependent on the cultural values and backgrounds of
the judges who made these determinations.
We then explained how courts and Congress attempted to avoid this
problem by structuring copyright law in a way that mimmized the role that
assessments of artistic value would have. In the context of determinations
of infringement, courts have used the idea-expression dichotomy in an
attempt to provide -some objective framework. The doctnne that there is a
dichotomy between the protectable expression in a work and the unprotect-
228. See supra notes 55-90 and accompanying text.
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able idea it expresses has its roots in the classical view that artistic works
reflect some umversal truths or transcendent essence that cannot and should
not be captured or controlled by one artist. Consistent with this view,
copyright law at one time protected only the particular form and format
used by the artist to express his or her ideas, and determinations of
infringement focused principally on the issue of independent creation.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there has been a change in the
prevailing view of the creative process. Romantic and post-Romantic views
of art and literature no longer see the creation of art and literature as
revealing or imitating universal truths, but rather see it as a process that is
valued for what it tells us about the artist and the artist's perceptions of
art. Thus, it is no longer necessary or valuable or even possible to dissect a
work of art to uncover the umversal truths or ideas which must remain
freely available to all future authors.m If people value instead that creative
process itself, rather than a particular end product, as conceptual artists
do,210 then copyright's focus on that end product seems nusplaced. Every
work of art, even if a copy of another's work, could be seen as valuable in
the sense that it was unique to the particular artist who engaged in that
process. 231 To the extent that copyright law rests on the view that the
government should prohibit copying of expression in order to protect the
original artist but allow the copying of ideas in order to encourage the
creation of new works, it may be missing the point. There may be no way
for the new artist to extract the "idea" without the "expression" of it, and
moreover, there may be no point in making that artist attempt to do so
because that artist's creation of his or her work may be considered valuable
as a reflection of that artist and that artist's definition of what is art.
For these reasons, the idea-expression dichotomy, conceptually grounded
in classical and neoclassical views of art that are no longer widely accepted,
is doomed to fail. Courts have no philosophical or objective basis on which
to rely in trying to distinguish the ideas from the expression in works of
art. Thus, the judge's assessment of the artistic value of the work, a subjective
229. See Hughes, supra note 99. Hughes suggests that in a Lockean view of intellectual
property, "idea" and "expression" could be distinguished by viewing "expression" as that
part of the process which involves labor, given the Lockean view of property as based on
labor. Hughes also recognizes, however, that often people cannot separate the "idea" from
the labor used to express or execute that idea because the labor precedes or occurs simulta-
neously with the development of the idea itself. Id. at 310-12, 314.
230. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
231. See Bernstein, The Fake as More, in IDEA ART, supra note 125, at 41-45. Bernstein
suggests that the art of painter Hank Herron, who produces "fake" paintings, that is, exact
reproductions of paintings by Frank Stella, has value for its philosoplucal statement about the
denial of originality. See also Battin, Exact Replication in the Visual Arts, 38 J. Ansmacs
& ART Ciuncisms 153-58 (1979) (author describes the humanistic values of copying other works
of art).
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determination that reflects the personal values and background of the judge,
has filled the vacuum in infnngement determinations.
Since this subjectivity is unavoidable in the context of deternmng m-
fringement, the courts should not hide behind the seemingly objective labels
of idea and expression. A straightforward and self-aware form of decision-
making and opinion writing is one necessary step in minimizing the problems
that are created when judges make copyright infringement decisions on the
basis of their assessments of the artistic merits of the works before them.
